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**SITUATION AND PROSPECTS OF YOUTH  
IN LATIN AMERICA**

INDIANA UNIVERSITY

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# CONTENTS

|                                                                                                         | Page |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------|
| Introduction .....                                                                                      | v    |
| I. DEMOGRAPHIC STRUCTURE AND YOUTH .....                                                                | 1    |
| 1. Importance of the youth population .....                                                             | 1    |
| 2. Urban growth and youth population .....                                                              | 1    |
| 3. Agrarian population .....                                                                            | 1    |
| 4. Different types of demographic evolution .....                                                       | 2    |
| II. THE INSERTION OF YOUNG PEOPLE INTO THE WORKING WORLD .....                                          | 4    |
| 1. Transformation of the production structure .....                                                     | 4    |
| 2. The participation of youth in the economically active population .....                               | 4    |
| 3. Youth in the different economic sectors .....                                                        | 5    |
| 4. Different types of development and occupational insertion of youth .....                             | 7    |
| III. YOUNG FEMALE LABOUR. GROWING IMPORTANCE .....                                                      | 9    |
| 1. Increase in female labour .....                                                                      | 9    |
| 2. Types of development and young female labour .....                                                   | 10   |
| IV. UNEMPLOYMENT AND UNDEREMPLOYMENT AMONG YOUTH .....                                                  | 11   |
| 1. Problems of unemployment .....                                                                       | 11   |
| 2. Problems of underemployment .....                                                                    | 11   |
| 3. Unemployment and educational levels .....                                                            | 12   |
| 4. Lack of correspondence between educational levels and occupational qualifications .....              | 13   |
| V. THE EDUCATIONAL TRANSFORMATION AND ITS IMPACT ON NEW GENERATIONS ....                                | 14   |
| 1. The great changes in the education of Latin American youth .....                                     | 14   |
| 2. Particular features of the educational transformation in the different countries of the region ..... | 15   |
| 3. Contradictions and conflicts arising from the educational transformation .....                       | 16   |
| VI. YOUTH IN MARGINAL SITUATIONS .....                                                                  | 17   |
| 1. Urban youth from marginal groups or in a situation at critical poverty .....                         | 19   |
| 2. Rural youth: margined youth in transformation .....                                                  | 21   |

|                                                                                   | <u>Page</u> |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|
| VII. COMPLEXITY OF THE CURRENT SITUATION AND FUTURE PROSPECTS .....               | 24          |
| 1. Structural problems .....                                                      | 24          |
| 2. The impact of the crisis, its effect on youth .....                            | 25          |
| VIII. THE UNCERTAINTIES OF THE FUTURE .....                                       | 27          |
| 1. Lack of a clear idea of the direction of the change .....                      | 27          |
| 2. Concern for youth as a reflection of uncertainty .....                         | 29          |
| IX. IMPORTANCE OF GENERATIONAL RELATIONSHIPS IN A SOCIETY IN TRANSFORMATION ..... | 30          |
| 1. The relationship between generations .....                                     | 30          |
| 2. Options and generational conflict .....                                        | 32          |
| X. YOUTH AND THEIR ROLE IN PROCESSES OF CHANGE .....                              | 32          |
| 1. Youth as a social movement .....                                               | 32          |
| 2. The youth social movement in the history of Latin America .....                | 34          |
| 3. Possible themes of the current youth movement .....                            | 38          |
| XI. SOCIETY AND YOUTH .....                                                       | 41          |
| 1. The relationship of society to youth: socialization .....                      | 41          |
| 2. The problems of social policy for young people .....                           | 44          |
| Notes .....                                                                       | 47          |
| Statistical annex .....                                                           | 49          |



## INTRODUCTION

This is not the first time that the United Nations, and especially ECLA, is approaching the topic of youth from the point of view of full and effective participation in society.<sup>1/</sup> However, the seriousness of the problems confronting the region, of which everyone is aware, are making the choices and demands of youth assume crucial significance, not only because the development process is closely linked to the situation and possible participation of youth, but also because of the fact that young people constitute a group that is extremely vulnerable to the effects of the crisis, especially in the way in which it manifests itself in Latin America.

The General Assembly has declared 1985 to be the International Youth Year and has approved a Programme of Measures and Activities in which concern for youth represents a long-term strategy from which sustained efforts are hoped for at the national, regional and international levels.

The purpose of this document is to examine the situation, prospects and needs of Latin American youth in the context of the changes which the region has undergone in recent decades and in the face of the difficulties of the present. Some ideas will be put forward on the role of youth with regard to the future and with respect to the responses which society must necessarily make to their demands. Aware of its limitations, however, we should consider it to be a preliminary attempt and the beginning of a renewed period of intellectual reflection on the role of youth in the search for new forms of development, which will no doubt be necessary for the readjustment of Latin America in the face of the challenge of the present and immediate future.

It is not easy to escape the conceptual obstacles represented in choosing an appropriate definition of youth. For statistical purposes, the United Nations defines youth as persons between 15 and 24 years of age; but the fact is that there is not, nor could there be, a universally-accepted definition of youth. Furthermore, given the current state of research, it is difficult to account for the diversity of social situations of Latin American youth.

A definition of youth which fits regional realities and needs is relatively difficult to come by since there exist many different criteria for determining it. A first criterion, of a biological nature, sets the initial point at puberty, that is, at the time when human beings acquire biological reproductive capacity, and closes the period at the time when biological development is concluded. A second criterion emphasizes the relationship between reproductive capacity and social dependence in relation to the adult generation, and locates its termination at the moment when young people can constitute a family and meet the needs of that family. A third is of a variable nature, according to the societies and groups to which it is applied, since it takes into consideration the time of education and leisure prior to the fulfilment of independent social positions.

/Because of



Because of the particular features of Latin American development, the situation of youth varies greatly according to the social group in question. For rural and marginal urban groups -which begin to work at an average age of 10 years- youth begins at a very early age, since from that moment on, they are initiated into economic and social responsibilities which put an abrupt end to the predominantly playful nature which childhood is supposed to have. In these same groups, the constitution of the family and the assumption of full responsibilities also begins at an early age. However, in labour and social relations, they continue to occupy subordinate positions typical of young people. For purposes of policy elaboration, the indication made above by way of example should be borne in mind, since the different subgroups of youth have different situations and needs. Although a series of common topics can be indicated, youth is far from being a monolithic group.

It should also be stressed that the situations and problems of youth are not a phenomenon concerning them exclusively, but reflect the problems of the societies in which they are inserted. Therefore, they should be analysed in the framework of the global economic development process and of social and political changes in the region, with special reference to the social, economic and cultural features grouped under the general category of "youth".

In this connection, one must keep in mind a few of the basic variables of the social transformation of the region in the last few decades. They include the magnitude of the population increase and its consequences on the availability of resources, the development possibilities of the economic system and the changes of society through growing differentiation of social activities. It is obvious that the demographic significance of youth is particularly relevant. Additional factors are the accelerated urbanization process, with its impact on the way in which national units are constituted; the trend towards integration of a system of values common to the population; the creation of conditions for social interaction, participation and mobilization; the exposure of the different strata of society to images of consumption; the problems of marginality and the demands for goods and services. Also important is the transformation of the economic structure, especially the industrialization process, which, although it has a different meaning and historical context in each case, has generally meant a change in the labour force, the development of a consumer goods market, the appearance of trends towards the constitution of a qualitatively different type of society in which new forms of rationality occur with respect to organization and social participation, and the development of scientific and technological capacity.

It is also well known that in some cases, the modern tertiary sector -especially State services- has expanded beyond what had been expected from the evolution experience of the now-developed countries and the phase of economic growth of the region.

To this may be added the impact of the transformation of agriculture, which is often reflected in emigration, the destruction of ancient indigenous cultural identities, the dismantling of peasant structures, the emergence of new social strata and the gradual interpenetration of the previously-separated rural and urban societies.

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Lastly, the most rapid transformation recorded has occurred in the region in the educational and cultural conditions of the population. Important progress has been achieved with respect to illiteracy; previously-elitist types of education, such as the university, have tended to spread to the masses. Despite the achievements, attention should be given to the sectors excluded from education, since they are subject to an extremely serious cultural marginalization process, whose negative effects are even greater than in the past.

The impact of the transformations on the social stratification, values, cultural models, shaping of personality and prospects for political action is undeniable. Despite the processes of change in the region, they are not unidirectional, nor do changes of a single tendency all take place at the same period in history; or, when they are realized, they occur in a social period which is qualitatively different, among other reasons, because of the prior historical form of the national social structures. This generates a relative feeling of uncertainty as to the future development of the Latin American societies. However, it is not a question of collecting indicators of a certain social instability, but of thinking in terms of societies which must confront the reformulation of the forms of international insertion and must also pay attention to their internal forms of social relations, for the purpose of defining new styles of development.

The enormous importance of the variable ideologies in our countries is due to the above. Unlike developed societies, in which the margins of structural change are relatively limiting, in the Latin American societies, the rapidity of the transformations permanently creates the idea that the possible may turn into the probable.

The changes referred to have a particular influence on youth both in the type of considerations with respect to the modality of formation they require in order to be able to participate in a society which in many respects will be different from the present society, and with respect to the role that youth may play in the creation of the new societal models that are being observed.

Not all the topics comprising this subject have been dealt with in this document, and it would have been difficult to do so; however, we have stressed the fact that youth constitute a group which will continue to be significant in the Latin American population until the end of the century, that, despite the efforts carried out in the area of education, enormous problems persist with regard to the training of the group as a whole, and that serious polarization still does appear between the highly-educated sectors and other, equally numerous sectors, which are in a situation of functional illiteracy. Incorporation into the labour market presents difficulties, and there is a new element: it is beginning to affect highly-educated sectors. Those lacking in education will meet growing difficulties in incorporating themselves into societies which are gradually becoming urban and whose type of employment require higher qualifications.

The distance, both in terms of education and experience of modernization, between the parents' and children's generations is so great as to affect families' socialization capacity and present serious challenges to educational institutions.

/The central

The central problem is that of the participation of youth. The region has a prolonged history with respect to the role of youth in political mobilization and promotion of social and cultural change. Bearing in mind what has been said of the process of transition in Latin America, the participation of youth is a key element in the orientation of the social change, and in the creation of the social bases for democratic forms, all of which has an influence on the possibility of carrying forward a different style of development.

In the last place, account should be taken of the type of relationship which society establishes with its youth, and the actions which the State carries out through its policies assume particular importance; nevertheless, it should be stressed once more that it is not or ' a question of an assistentialist policy. The decisive aspect is the recognition of the need for participation by youth in the definition of goal, and the ways of obtaining them.



## I. DEMOGRAPHIC STRUCTURE AND YOUTH 2/

### 1. Importance of the youth population

The numeric weight of Latin American youth, that is, the segment of population between 15 and 24 years of age, is one of the highest in the world, and can only be compared with that of Southern Asia; in both cases young people represent 20.2% of the population of these regions. The growth rate of the global population during the period 1960-1980 was, along with that of Africa, the highest in the world, and although the rate of growth is expected to decrease in the period 1980-2000, Latin America will continue to be one of the most rapidly-growing regions.

The total number of young people in 1960 was 38.5 million and in 1980, 73.3 million, so that in recent years, the youth population has practically doubled. Furthermore, due to well-known demographic factors (global fertility rate, decrease in infant mortality, etc.), the proportion of young people in relation to the total population of Latin America has increased; thus, although in 1960 youth represented 17.9% of the total population, in 1980 that proportion was 20.2%.

The estimated figure for the year 2000 amounts to 19% of the total population, and, although that would represent a slight decrease with respect to the current figure, it would continue to be very considerable.

### 2. Urban growth and youth population

It should be noted that this phenomenon of population growth takes place with high rates of urbanization, whose growth rate is still considerable, although it definitely does not amount to the accelerated rates of the 1950s. Thus, the proportion of the urban population has increased appreciably; in 1950 it represented 41% of the total, while it amounts to 63% today.

The proportion of young people residing in urban areas is even greater than that figure and amounts to 65.2%. To a certain extent, this is due to processes of internal migration of youth from rural areas to urban areas.

It is commonly assumed that these trends will become accentuated in the future and that Latin American society will come to be highly urban. It is estimated that 73% of its total population will have such features in the year 2000. It should also be pointed out that everything points to the fact that urban concentration will be linked, as it has been until now, preferably to the growth of the large cities. In the 1970s, the population of the metropolitan areas represented 22% of the total population and 40% of the urban population.

### 3. Agrarian population

Our view of urban growth generally tends to be positive, and it is often assumed that the decrease in the rural population rates is a clear indicator of modernization and development. Nevertheless it should be borne in mind that,

/except for

except for some zones in the region, the density of inhabitants per square kilometre of area is not high, and would permit better conditions for human settlements if the man/land ratio were more favourable. Furthermore, the average annual growth rate of the agricultural product in the 1970s amounted to 3.3%, making agriculture remain behind the rest of the economic activities (in the same decade, the average annual growth rate of the total gross domestic product amounted to 5.8%). The point we wish to make is that the main problem does not consist so much of the fact that there is a surplus of agricultural population, but that inefficient use is made of it.

It should also be borne in mind that a phenomenon of aging has occurred in the rural population; in 1970 35.0% of the rural population was 25 years of age or older, the percentage calculated in 1980 rose to 36.2%, and the estimate for the year 2000 was 41.7%. It is obvious that such a phenomenon is due to the rural exodus much more than other factors.

#### 4. Different types of demographic evolution

As we know, the Latin American region presents a great diversity of situations, both if the countries are compared to each other and among the different regions of each country. In order to account for this circumstance to some extent, a classification has been used which takes into consideration the magnitude of the fertility rates, the level of the per capita gross domestic product and the percentage of the urban population and divides the countries into three large groups.<sup>3/</sup>

The first group is composed of Argentina, Costa Rica, Cuba, Chile and Uruguay. This group of countries currently shows the lowest fertility rates of the region. In the case of Argentina and Uruguay, this feature is of fairly long date, at least much earlier than the period 1955-1960. In Costa Rica, Cuba and Chile the fertility rate has decreased obviously although with different intensity, with respect to its 1955-1960 level, and it is estimated that this trend will become even more marked in future.

The foreseen effects may be of importance. It should be borne in mind that this group of countries contains Costa Rica and Chile, which in 1980 were among those countries with the most young people in the region. The prediction for the year 2000 is that the countries in this group as a whole will have the lowest proportion of youth population in Latin America.

Another fact worth emphasizing is that the population of these countries, with the exception of Costa Rica is predominantly urban.

In short, this group of countries represents 14.6% of the population of the region. It stands out because its demographic trends precede those of the region as a whole. It also demonstrates the best relative level of socio-economic development, and it should be emphasized that, according to estimates for the year 2000, this group will have the lowest relative weight of young people in the total population.

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A second group of countries is composed of Bolivia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru and the Dominican Republic. Since nearly all of them have very high fertility rates, their rate of population growth will certainly be the highest in the entire region. Furthermore, the rate of growth of the population between 15 and 24 years of age will be equal to or higher than that of the total population. Therefore, these will be the countries which will have the highest rates of youth population in the year 2000.

Another feature of the countries in this group is that urbanization has occurred later. With the exceptions of Nicaragua and Peru, the urban population is lower than 50%, with the extreme case of Haiti, where the urban population amounts to only 23%.

In summary, this group represents approximately 18% of the population of the region, and it is estimated that this percentage will increase in the year 2000 and will constitute around one-fifth of the population of Latin America at that date. It is also predicted that the presence of youth in the total population will be the highest in Latin America at that time.

A third group of countries is composed of those whose indicators fall into an intermediate category despite the fact that from the demographic point of view, they present different trends. In the case of Brazil, Colombia and Panama, fertility has decreased strikingly, and this trend is expected to be maintained through the year 2000. On the other hand, Mexico and Venezuela, with high per capita products and urbanization rates that are also considerable, will probably maintain a high growth rate, both with respect to the population as a whole and the youth segment of it.

In short, if the population in general, including young people, is due to grow at fairly significant rates, and if at the same time there is a continual urbanization process in progress, although the latter does not have the accelerated rate of the 1950s, the region as a whole will be urban to a large extent -approximately 73% of the total population- in the year 2000. There will also be different kinds of demographic transformation, according to each country's types of structure, for which reason they will present different features and problems, with respect to young people, in some important aspects.

## 2. The participation of youth in the economically active population

The economically active population of the region in 1960 (5) amounted to 43.7% of the total population. One of its most noteworthy features was the high proportion of young people composing it; it was estimated

/VII. THE



## II. THE INSERTION OF YOUNG PEOPLE INTO THE WORKING WORLD

### 1. Transformation of the production structure 4/

The changes in this aspect have been extremely significant in Latin America, although a wide diversity of national situations and trends may be observed. In the region as a whole, one of the most important phenomena has been the industrialization process, which ranges from more or less incipient forms of import substitution to technologically more advanced types of industrialization, capable of producing for both the national and international markets. From the end of the Second World War an increase could be observed in the productive forces of the secondary sector, with an increase in the productivity of the labour force and of firms, which resulted in a rise in the national product. But in addition, emphasis should be placed on the role the manufacturing industry played in terms of absorption of the labour force. During the past thirty years, employment in the manufacturing sector increased at a rate of 3.4% per year, and thus, large sectors of the population were, to a certain extent, able to see their expectations satisfied both in their socio-occupational position and in having access, in general terms, to expanding and more differentiated forms of consumption.

However, in a certain number of countries, the incorporation of labour into the secondary sector appears to have declined in the last decade. Nevertheless, development of the tertiary sector has shown the dynamism that the secondary sector ceased to demonstrate. In the last twenty years, the expansion of the so-called "modern tertiary sector" and especially of State services, has expanded notably. All this has been beyond what the region's stage of economic growth and the evolution experience of the now-developed countries have led to expect. In some countries the "tertiarization" of the economy has generally produced a spiralling of urban employment, not only manual but also of the type requiring an ever higher intellectual formation.

One well-known fact is the decrease of the share of agriculture in the composition of the gross domestic product. While in 1970 it contributed 13.3% to the global product of the region, in 1980 its contribution fell to 10.3%. Nevertheless, despite these changes, the continued importance of agriculture as a source of labour should not be underrated. It was estimated that in 1980, 36% of the economically active population was in that sector; from that point of view, therefore, it continues to be the single most important sector.

### 2. The participation of youth in the economically active population 5/

The economically active population of the region in 1980 6/ amounted to 45.2% of the total population ten years of age and over. One of its most noteworthy features was the high proportion of young people composing it; it was estimated

/that in

that in that year, one-third of the Latin American labour force was comprised of young people from 10 to 24 years of age. Another fact worth noting is that 59% of them were located in urban areas. Thus, in 1980, 48.2% of the total young people between 15 and 24 years of age were incorporated into the work force. As is to be expected, this phenomenon is greater in the rural than in the urban area, 52.1% and 46.1% respectively.

This plentiful contribution of young labour has some important effects. The demand for work in the region is lower than the supply, and as a result, in some cases there may be a displacement of adult employment by youth who may be hired with greater advantages for the employer, or in other cases there may be high rates of youth unemployment. A decrease of youth in the composition of the total economically active population has been noted in Latin America, basically due to the increase in the coverage of the educational system. The participation of youth is expected to decrease to around 27.5% of the economically active population in the year 2000. Despite this decrease, the estimated absolute number of persons who would be incorporated into the labour market is impressive; it has been calculated that between 1980 and 2000, around 4.1 million persons would enter the market annually. It is also highly probable that the urban nature of the economically active population will intensify, and that the presence of women in its composition will increase.

### 3. Youth in the different economic sectors

#### a) Youth and agricultural activity

Although it is true that the number of persons incorporated into agricultural activity continues to be very high, as indicated above, its relative -and in some cases even absolute- decrease is one of the most significant phenomena of the transformation of the occupational structure of the region. This fact is particularly pronounced among young people, who have generally been the main participants in rural-urban migration. In the countries for which detailed information is available, a greater reduction in the agricultural participation rates has been recorded among young people than among adults. From the point of view of the percentage of youth in agricultural activities, some comparative figures between 1960 and 1970 are highly illustrative. In countries such as Argentina and Chile, which in 1960 were already showing relatively low percentages of youth population in agricultural activities (with respect to the total economically active population between 15 and 24 years of age), 19.3% and 26.4% respectively, in 1970 the figures decreased to 13.2% in Argentina and 22.8% in Chile.

In a country such as Mexico, which in 1960 had 53.6% of its economically active youth population in agricultural activities, the figure decreased to 35.1%; similar phenomena occurred in Colombia, Costa Rica and Panama and probably in several other countries.

/Even bearing

Even bearing in mind the transformation indicated above, some features of the problem should be emphasized. The rural young person is less educated than his counterpart and enters the working world prematurely. In general, he is incorporated into a type of agricultural employment which he has few possibilities of leaving, given his low educational level and the increasingly higher educational requirements for applying for non-agricultural occupations. It is therefore not surprising that there is a nucleus of social marginality among young people in agriculture, which in turn forms a cycle of intensive reproduction of marginality. The marked differences between the educational levels of urban and rural youth illustrate this fact. Available data for Panama, through the population census of 1980, and for Chile, from the National Employment Survey (October-December 1980), indicate that in the case of Panama only 3.4% of urban youth (15-24 years) have an educational level of less than three years, while the percentage rises to 17.3 in the case of rural youth. In the case of Chile, only 3.0% of urban youth have less than three years of education, while 10.7% of rural youth are in this category. If we take the opposite view, the figures are also significant: in Chile 53.7% of urban youth have 10 years of education or more, and 44% in Panama, while in rural areas the percentage in Chile is only 17.6% and 17.1% in Panama.

b) Youth and urban activities

It is commonly stated that the accelerated urbanization process has not been accompanied by a corresponding creation of jobs and as a result, this has forced young people to seek jobs in the informal tertiary sector, whose main features are underemployment and disguised unemployment, such as occur in jobs in domestic service, personal services or itinerant trade. However, without disregarding the possible truth of that statement, the fact of greatest significance would appear to be that the youth of the region are undergoing increasing segmentation in their forms of occupational insertion, which results in extreme polarization between the different social strata of youth.

For example, youth in the rural sector who have succeeded in migrating to the cities, compared with those who remain in agricultural activity, are generally the ones who have better preparation, education and capacity for meeting situations of change. However, not only do those young migrants come up against considerable cultural barriers, but they are also disadvantaged with respect to youth of urban origin. Their educational level is so elementary that they meet prolonged difficulties in obtaining stable employment. They are often forced to resort to activities which actually constitute disguised unemployment. Such young people have occupations mainly in the lower strata of services and trade activities, which are characterized by a low capital-labour ratio, low productivity and low remuneration level.

With regard to urban youth specifically, one observes a highly differentiated and increasingly complex internal structure, and this gives rise to simultaneous and contradictory processes of differentiation and occupational mobility.

/Youth from



Youth from the lowest strata, those whose families may be classified as belonging to the critical poverty category, tend to remain confined to closed circuits of marginality, a situation which is made even more acute by the excluding features of the style of development prevailing in the region.

A different dimension is provided by the fact that there is a trend in the cities towards expansion of trade and service areas, especially in their modern sectors. A similar statement may be made concerning industrial employment, whose modern sector, that is, enterprises of high productivity and technological complexity, is expanding. In either of the cases, personnel recruitment favours the possession of high educational levels and a type of prior training which ensures the applicant's adaptability to the work environment in the sector and serves as an indicator of his potential for future training.

Without doubt, much of the absorption of the young human resources in the modern tertiary sector in recent years is linked to the vast expansion since the beginning of the 1970s, of education, social services, administration and State functions. The growth of public employment was especially marked and even increased its rate in the 1960s, although in some countries, from the second half of that decade a change in policy occurred in relation to the development and growth of State activities, which abruptly checked the process in those cases.

It should be borne in mind that during 1970-1980, a certain dynamism was observed in the modern tertiary sector, which became a source of jobs for youth with higher education. Such processes took place mainly in those countries where the processes of social change and economic transformation were characterized either by a substantial growth rate or by the development of production support services, social and urban services in general, or by both phenomena, which was accompanied, in other countries, by a reduction in the rate of incorporation of new young labour into industry.

#### 4. Different types of development and occupational insertion of youth

With reference to the first grouping of countries indicated in chapter I, section 4 (Argentina, Costa Rica, Cuba, Chile and Uruguay), youth participation in the labour force fluctuates between 24% and 26%, of which 80% of the supply is found in urban areas. For these countries it is estimated that the growth rates of the economically active population, both total and youth, will be the lowest in regional terms. This fact is accentuated in Costa Rica and Cuba, which show a marked decrease in their fertility rates.

The second group, which includes Bolivia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru and the Dominican Republic, is composed, with the exception of Peru, of countries in which the rural sector is predominant. As a result, agricultural activity continues to be the main

employment-generating activity. In urban areas, the informal sector and domestic service occupy a substantial portion of the labour force. The industrial and service sectors are proportionally lower than those of the rest of the countries of the region, and it may be surmised that the latter sector is substantially composed of unskilled personal services.

In this group of countries, the presence of youth labour (10-24 years) is the highest in the composition of the economically active population and in some cases represents around 40% of the total labour supply in 1980. The labour of children between 10 and 14 years of age is fairly common, especially in the rural areas. In countries such as El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua and the Dominican Republic, more than 30% of the children in this age category are in the labour market. It should be borne in mind that minors who have entered the labour market are generally engaged in full-time work.

It is estimated that between 1980 and 2000, the growth rate of the economically active population will be quite high, exceeding 3% per year in some countries; however, this growth may take place with the problems referred to above.

The third group of countries, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, Panama and Venezuela, is characterized by the co-existence of a relatively numerous agricultural sector and a substantial portion of modern industries and services. The proportion of youth (10-24 years) in the total labour supply fluctuates from 31% in Venezuela to 36% in Colombia.

If the occupational structure of these countries in 1980 is considered, it is observed that agriculture in many of them -especially Brazil and Mexico- continued to be the sector generating the most employment (37% of the economically active population). Mention has been made of the growing importance of the modern portion of the service and industry sector, but the latter not only co-exists along with substantial agricultural activity, but also with very inefficient forms of employment. By way of example, we may cite the case of Colombia and Mexico, whose informal sector absorbs 16% and 18% of the urban labour force respectively.

The estimates of the probable evolution which the labour force in these countries will undergo through the year 2000 predict growth rates slightly lower than that of the predominantly rural countries referred to previously. The latter will be around 3% per year, and in the former case it will probably be higher than that percentage. With regard to youth participation in the labour force, it is assumed that Mexico and Venezuela will maintain growth rates of 2.6% per year, while in Brazil, Colombia and Panama, the growth rates will be slightly higher than 1% per year. It is obvious that these rates will largely depend on the behaviour of the fertility rates and on the type of educational coverage available to the population.

### III. YOUNG FEMALE LABOUR. GROWING IMPORTANCE 7/

#### 1. Increase in female labour

Female labour tends, in some categories, not to be recorded statistically, and that omission is even more serious in the case of agricultural activities. Nevertheless, despite these discrepancies in the information, a growing incorporation of women into the labour force, or at least into work recognized as such, can be noted.

The total economically active population of the region increased at a rate of 2.9% between 1970-1980; during the same period, the economically active female population increased at a rate of 3.6%. The highest growth was recorded in urban areas, where the rate of increase of the economically active female population amounted to 4.4% per year.

It should be noted that the highest increase in the rates of participation of women in the last 10 years occurs among young women, especially those in the 20 to 24 years age group. Furthermore, a distinction must be made between the forms of occupational insertion of women in different social strata. The Regional Employment Programme for Latin America and the Caribbean (PREALC) estimates that in 1980, the informal sector absorbed 14% of the total economically active population in the urban zones of Latin America, and domestic service around 6%, and it is supposed that a substantial portion of these groups is composed of young women.

The incorporation of women into the working world has various facets, and if in the case of middle- and high-income sectors there are, in addition to other determining factors, some personal options linked to self-actualization, among young women from working-class sectors, even though their early entry into the labour market is due more to family survival strategies, they are nevertheless increasingly tending to perceive employment in positive terms.

The occupational activities of women belonging to the middle-income strata tend to be concentrated in trade, administration and especially social services, among which education is usually the highest category followed by health and social welfare.

Women in the popular strata tend to perform activities in the traditional tertiary sector, especially domestic service, although this phenomenon seems to be decreasing in some countries. In Chile and Panama, the countries for which up-to-date information is available, a gradual decrease is being recorded in the number of young women between 15 and 24 years of age who are performing domestic service. In the first country, in 1960 48% of the total number of women performing that function was composed of young people; the percentage decreased to 40% in 1970 and to 29% in 1980. A similar trend is recorded in Panama, where the percentages for the same years were 40%, 36% and 28%. They also play an important role in small business and itinerant trade. In the case of women workers, they are incorporated into activities such as textile manufacturing or electronic products assembly, which absorb a high volume of female labour.

/Emphasis should



Emphasis should be placed on the polarization of female labour, a phenomenon which tends to perpetuate itself. At one extreme are the women from the middle- and upper strata who have a high degree of education, work in non-manual activities and have a higher participation in the economically active population than the men in their group; at the other, are women from the popular sectors, barely-educated and working in the traditional tertiary sector.

## 2. Types of development and young female labour

In the countries of early urbanization, the number of women making up the economically active population is comparatively high, although the increase in supply appears to be more or less stabilized. Since these are countries of early urbanization, women were incorporated into the labour market earlier than in other countries, which explains the trend above.

The high proportion of women in the economically active young population in Argentina, 34%, is striking, since the percentage is considerably higher than the female participation in the total economically active population, 26%. If account is taken of the country's type of development it may be assumed that an occupational demand has been created, even for relatively skilled services, which preferably incorporates young women, whose time spent in the occupational market would only be temporary. Furthermore, the female labour curve in the country is bimodal, a phenomenon which can certainly be attributed to the fact that women leave their jobs when they marry or have children, although a small portion re-enter the occupational market when their children are older.

In the predominantly agrarian countries, the rates of participation of women in the labour force have increased considerably, especially between 1970 and 1980, although account should be taken of the fact that the measured participation of women in the labour force has been very low. The source of employment is domestic work or non-remunerated family work; the latter not being recorded in the official statistics. As stated earlier, the informal sector is also important with respect to recruitment of young women into the labour force.

## IV. UNEMPLOYMENT

#### IV. UNEMPLOYMENT AND UNDEREMPLOYMENT AMONG YOUTH 8/

##### 1. Problems of unemployment

One of the greatest problems confronting Latin American youth is the lack of employment opportunities. Open unemployment is particularly acute among youth in urban areas, and rates of 15% or more are common. In many cases it is not unlikely for youth to represent more than 50% of the total unemployed of all ages, and it should be pointed out that this does not only involve adolescent unemployment. At times half of the unemployed young people are in the 20-24 years age group. Unemployment also affects mainly young women.

Empirical research on patterns of youth unemployment in Latin America indicate that a great deal of the present high level of youth unemployment is related to the very high labour turnover rates exhibited by that group, since they are often able to find only precarious and casual jobs. Furthermore, the burden of youth unemployment is unevenly distributed and falls heaviest on those from the low socio-economic urban strata, who experience serious and prolonged difficulties in the labour market.

Moreover, unemployment to some extent is observed among youth who should, because of their capacities and qualifications -especially educational- have less difficulty in terms of employment possibilities. However, this can be explained by the fact that such young people are usually in a position to devote a longer period of time in searching for work more suited to their capabilities, but once they find it, there is a greater tendency towards stability in that stratum than among youth from low socio-economic strata.

##### 2. Problems of underemployment

Underemployment among Latin American youth has even more alarming features than open unemployment, although in situations of recession such as the current one, open unemployment is obviously critical.

The incorporation of youth into dead-end jobs and the plight of young people who are not active in the labour force but are not incorporated into the educational system either contribute to the persistence and extension of situations of critical poverty.

Dead-end jobs are not exclusively low-wage positions, but are often precarious casual jobs with little prospect either of a stable career or the acquisition of useful training and experience.

Marginal youth and those from low income strata are commonly affected by the above. Research on youth employment in a marginal area of Santiago, Chile, conducted in 1975, showed that 43% of employed persons in the 15-18 years age group were either in casual jobs or jobs with fluctuating income. Another 14% worked as domestic servants and 12% in the government Minimum Employment Plan. Only 25% had regular jobs with steady incomes, and of these half worked as messenger boys or maintenance workers.

/It is

It is often affirmed that many young people have precarious or casual jobs because the jobs are only a supplement to their main activity, which is that of student. This does not appear to be the case for Latin America; in countries such as Brazil and Chile the reverse has been found to be the case. If account is taken of the hours and conditions devoted to the activities of study and work, such young people are primarily workers who usually study part-time in evening programmes which, moreover, have been designed for adults and not to satisfy the educational needs of young people.

### 3. Unemployment and educational levels

It should be recalled that various empirical studies have shown that in Latin America, especially in urban areas, education was a highly significant discriminatory variable. Educational deficiencies appeared linked, in a rigid vicious circle, to poverty. And at the beginning of the last decade, persons between 20 and 29 years of age who had less than 3 years of primary education were practically excluded from jobs in the modern tertiary sector; it was very difficult for them to obtain employment as industrial workers and even in other activities. Most of them could incorporate themselves only into agriculture or the informal urban sector.

Unemployment generally tended to be lower to the extent that the educational level was higher. There appears to be a certain stepwise pattern in urban areas. For men, open unemployment declines gradually with increased elementary schooling. Completed basic education appears to represent a plateau. A second level corresponds to secondary education; those who leave school with incomplete secondary education have difficulties, while considerably less unemployment is registered at completed secondary levels. The problems recorded by the statistics for persons with incomplete secondary education are largely due to what could be called an inconsistency of situation. Young people with intermediate education consider that the activities they can perform -and for which they have in part been trained- correspond to a qualitatively different level than those carried out by persons with only primary education. But since they have not completed their secondary education, their situation is ambiguous, and they believe that the positions offered to them are lower than their qualifications.

It is obvious that in the relatively less-developed countries, the majority of young unemployed people is concentrated among unskilled persons with little education, but in countries such as Argentina and to a lesser extent Chile, the unemployed with some or even complete secondary education account for a high percentage of the total unemployed in the 20-24 years age group.

It is interesting to examine the distorting effects which can sometimes be caused by the scarcity of the labour market in relation to supply. A permanent increase is being observed in the educational requirements for jobs which do not require very high qualifications, as is the case for some administrative or even manual occupations. But this is not only visible as regards persons with little education; the considerable increase in supply of young people with university training has led them to compete in segments of the labour market traditionally reserved for graduates of secondary education.

/An additional



An additional comment should be made concerning women, among whom the unemployment levels of those who have completed their secondary education are very high; at times their situation is worse than that of illiterate and poorly-educated women, who find work in domestic service jobs, cottage industry and other informal sector occupations where education is not a decisive factor. In any case, educated young women with secondary or higher education encounter more difficulty than young men with equal qualifications in keeping out of the ranks of the unemployed.

4. Lack of correspondence between educational levels and occupational qualifications

Given the considerable expansion of the educational system and especially that of its secondary and post-secondary levels, it cannot be hoped that occupations requiring a capacity for organization and direction will increase at the same rate. As a result, it is normal for the educational levels to be higher among the young generations than the previous ones for performing the same type of occupation. This phenomenon has been qualified as negative because it was considered to indicate an inconsistency between education and its use. However, it should be noted that the highest levels of educational formation improve the cultural and human profile of society and that, although higher education is not always necessary to perform specific occupations, the complexity of urban social life and of both public and private productive and service organizations does require a higher level of culture from their members. It should also be stated that greater human capacity makes it possible to adapt to changing technological projects and that greater efficiency in the performance of tasks often cannot be measured quantitatively because it is reflected in the quality of the products created or services rendered. Finally, it should be observed that a polarization in urban occupations is being produced between mere activities of execution, simplified by the production processes, and others which assume initiative and adaptive and problem-solving capabilities. Under these conditions, it cannot be proposed that the educational systems should train some for repetitive activities and others for innovative activities, because of the consequences that such an allocation would have for social life in general and especially its democratic dimensions.

The graduate of the educational system cannot be considered to be an end product designed precisely to perform specific occupation, since throughout working life, many apprenticeships occur which are just as important as the initial educational training and which form the basis for labour mobility, central to a process of productive change such as the one being recorded in Latin America. This explains why the same types of jobs in the industrial sector are being carried out by persons with different educational levels.<sup>10/</sup>

Employers, for their part, are faced with an occupational demand which is much greater than supply, especially for those occupations which provide satisfactory income and social status. This leads them to require educational credentials which are increasingly higher and which in some cases are not necessary for the posts to be filled. This behaviour is also influenced by the provisions on future occupational mobility in countries where industrial organizations had or have social power were able to include in their labour agreements.

/The negative

The negative aspect of this process is the fact that the social groups which recently acquired some degree of education are finding themselves passed over in the job market, since the highly-educated, when they are not able to find the most prestigious occupations, shift to those of lower rank, causing a generalized downward movement in which the lowest ranks, that is those with rudimentary educations, are driven out of the formal job market.

In any case the solutions do not lie in a reduction of educational supply but in better coverage for marginal social groups so that they might compete in the labour market and in a way that the improvement of the educational profile of youth even in cases where they cannot be used in the immediate future would be extremely significant in Latin America's necessary transition period towards a society gradually permeated by knowledge and towards a production system increasingly conditioned by technology.

This view of the problem implies that education should not be expected to act as a stepping-stone to high social positions, but as a necessary formation for human development and scientific-technological competence.

#### V. THE EDUCATIONAL TRANSFORMATION AND ITS IMPACT ON NEW GENERATIONS 11/

##### 1. The great changes in the education of Latin American youth

In the last three decades, changes in education have occurred which are appearing among youth and will have a greater influence in the future on the generations currently being educated. In the 1950s, illiteracy had reached alarming proportions: half of the population over 15 years of age in many countries of the region were declaring themselves to be illiterate. Today, on the other hand, in a series of countries, illiteracy is already residual among youth; in others it is predominantly decreasing, which indicates that it will probably be residual towards the end of the century. Nevertheless, in countries with a high percentage of agricultural population or with a substantial indigenous ethnic component, illiteracy figures higher than 15% are still being recorded. It should be borne in mind that the most heavily populated country of the region, Brazil, is also in that situation. It should also be stressed that the perpetuation of a group of illiterates, under chronic conditions and even into the future, implies a greater social discrimination than in the past.

Closely connected to the above is the fact that, although nearly all children today have access to primary school, only half of them manage to complete an average educational cycle of 6 years. This has an influence on the current and future youth generations, by creating a serious cultural and social imbalance, since it is absolutely essential for the population to share a basic cultural code in order to achieve the best economic, social and political development.

/Secondary education

Secondary education was generally characterized in the past as being a type of elitist formation conceived as a path to university studies although, in some cases, it also qualified people to perform some middle-level functions, especially in teaching or bureaucratic posts. This was often accompanied by manual technical training with a high practical component, acquired by some urban groups of a low social level. Secondary education has been changing into a gradually more integrated type of education with regard to general cultural formation and, very importantly, is reaching a higher proportion of the population, between 15% and 70% of the 13-19 years age group, although with marked variations among countries.

Finally, higher education has experienced a rapid quantitative transformation. Towards 1950 it included only slightly more than 1% of youth from 20 to 24 years of age, while today it reaches more than 16% and in nearly all the countries of the region, at least one in every ten young people of university age attends the university.

These quantitative changes must be borne in mind, because they account for an important qualitative change. Elitist levels have changed into mass levels for the youth population, so that youth must be considered as a potential human resource whose cultural capacity and future political participation will be of great influence in the transformation of Latin America.

Furthermore, the speed and extent of the change have meant a break between past generations and the present one. In most cases the family encountered difficulties in acting as an efficient socialization agent for the new generations; the majority of them lacked the cultural elements for expressing the message they hoped to transmit to their children. A socialization among "young peers" has occurred; in many cases, young people share daily experiences in educational institutions and extend this social interaction in the search for spaces of their own for recreation, dialogue or political communication.

## 2. Particular features of the educational transformation in the different countries of the region

As has been implied, the specific form which the educational transformations in the region have taken acquire particular features in each country. A first group contains the countries of early educational modernization which have achieved nearly total primary school attendance and a consistent development of their secondary and higher educational levels.

Another group of countries can be characterized as having a kind of "mutation" in its educational levels; they are characterized by the continuation of substantial and numerous social groups excluded from obtaining complete primary education, although at the same time, they have vastly expanded their levels of higher education and are the countries of the region in which the highest university attendance is recorded.

/A third



A third group is characterized by the inequality of the transformation, and shows marked differences between the rural and urban populations and regional gaps within the countries. The educational expansion in these cases has had the same distortions as economic development and in addition appears to be closely connected to the patterns of income concentration.

Finally, there are cases in which there has been an integral planning of the educational process, which has emphasized both integral and basic education and literacy programmes in the traditionally excluded sectors. This has involved a policy of equalizing society through education, which at the higher levels, often constitutes a mechanism for selection of human resources with a definite connection to the economic system and its estimated labour needs.

### 3. Contradictions and conflicts arising from the educational transformation

It is natural for a quantitative expansion of the size indicated -without the intervention of a programme of teacher training, endowment of material resources and educational renovation- easily to result in a deterioration in the quality of the knowledge transmitted for the social groups recently incorporated into the educational system. In this sense the democratic transformation in terms of volume was not accompanied by a similar transformation in the nature of scholastic culture and in the ways in which knowledge was transmitted. In general, both continue to be conceived as if it were a question of education for the elite, and therefore are proving to be inadequate for incorporating people from subcultures so highly differentiated as those resulting from the social heterogeneity of the region into a universal culture.

Furthermore, the universalization of education assumes the principle of selection based on merit for the different positions in society, which comes into strong opposition with the orientation of the privileged groups, who resist that type of democratization in the social area. As a result, the educational forum has implicitly become an area in which opposing pressures are brought to bear: the great majority demands a universal education and the high-strata group attempt to cancel out that egalitarian effect through a stratification of the educational system in which, while some teaching cycles continue to educate at the highest scientific and academic level, the others, which are products of the recent expansion, because of a deterioration of material and human resources and an often hasty acceptance of educational aspirations, find that they are forced to provide an education of low cultural and scientific content, in which the ritual passing of courses tends to be as easy as admission itself.

Under such conditions, education ceases to be the cultural and social homogenization agent and gives rise to education characterized by the type of institution in which it was carried out, so that the high-strata groups recover the distinguishing value of knowledge while the diplomas obtained by the masses lose prestige. In some countries, this phenomenon has had the obvious manifestation of the emergence of a university system ranging from centres of excellence through institutions of mere accreditation, whose education would not be much higher than that of a high school.

/In this

In this way, selection takes place according to presumed criteria of knowledge which would mainly be attributed to the type of institution in which the people were educated, making it possible to enhance the prestige of some educational institutions traditionally directed towards the formation of an élite or towards attracting special groups of privileged social status. Such selection would not be very different from the traditional or ascriptive type, according to which individuals are chosen to perform specific jobs by virtue of their social origin. This would now be manifested in the type of educational institution, which would have the result of weakening the democratic effect of the quantitative expansion.

## VI. YOUTH IN MARGINAL SITUATIONS

Analyses of marginality in Latin America have been closely linked to the phenomenon of rapid urban growth. It has generally been associated with phenomena of precarious incorporation into the city, and its most visible dimension was the emergence of shantytowns known by different names in each country: "villas miserias", "favelas", "poblaciones callampas", etc. But not only were precarious living situations involved, but it was argued that the existence of the shantytowns was the result of certain insufficiencies of economic growth, in that, for example, the population grew more rapidly than the availability of employment, and that the industrialization that had been taking place did not have sufficient dynamism to generate the employment which would solve the problem. The phenomenon was aggravated by the migration from the country to the cities, which was affected both by phenomena of exodus from agrarian zones because of their inability to keep a large quantity of people employed, and by the attraction of the modern urban world for rural inhabitants.

At the beginning, it was argued that a phenomenon similar to that caused in Europe by the industrial revolution was taking place and that it could therefore be temporary. That is, in a beginning stage some population imbalances and uprootings with respect to their traditional occupations were predictable, which would later be solved by the new opportunities which the modern structure would create.

However, it soon became obvious that in Latin America the processes were different. Although the growth of employment in industrial activities was considerable, there was a much more rapid increase in the service sector, both the personal service sector typical of informal employment and a modern tertiary sector which included employment in production support services, trade and social and community services, which were considered to be surplus employment because they exceeded -in percentage of the economically active population- that recorded in similar stages in the now-developed economies. Both phenomena were attributed to the lack of dynamism of the economic system to generate productive employment. In addition, it was pointed out that Latin American industrial development was being carried out with a technology which was not the most appropriate for our conditions. Modern technology tended to economize labour and make intensive use of capital; that was not suited to the conditions of the countries of the region, which had plentiful labour but not a great amount of capital available.

/Recent analyses

Recent analyses on the modern tertiary sector indicate that the rise of that sector does not have the negative features which are attributed to it, because it is in part a support for production activities -for example, financial services- and in part provides forms of distribution of social income and formation of the capacities necessary for economic and social organization purposes, such as education and health.

But in fact the problem of marginality does persist. In concrete terms, all of these observations led to the abandoning of the theory according to which marginality was temporary and emphasized the study of the determining factors of its durability. Thus, the chief concern today centres on learning about the so-called "circuits of marginality", which is equivalent to analysing how marginality is reproduced. This is of supreme importance in studies on youth since it is obvious that the conditions for perpetuation of marginality appear in that group.

The persistence of marginality appears to be closely linked to the modalities of the styles of economic development of Latin America. If one definition of marginality can be the absence of a relatively equal share for people of available goods, whether the latter are economic, cultural or social, this is not simply for lack of those items, but rather due to problems deriving from the type of development prevailing in the region, which tends towards the concentration of those resources, with the resulting exclusion or margination of certain social sectors.

The concentration is particularly obvious in the economic sphere and, as has repeatedly been shown, it takes place at two main levels; at one level, a few enterprises concentrate the advantages of the adoption of high-productivity modern technology and therefore generate most of the economic growth; while at the other there is a concentration of income by empresarios or capitalists -especially connected with the type of enterprises indicated above- and, although to a much lesser extent, by those who perform tasks or functions linked to that modern stratum. In this way a majority of urban workers remain excluded from the benefits of the progress and as a result are compelled to work in what may be termed the "subsistence sector".

The concentration process also manifests itself at the locational level, since most of the processing industry, technical and financial services and infrastructure prefer to have a metropolitan location. The result is a relative or absolute margination of large geographical areas, which have firmly-rooted population contingents of a considerable size; this is particularly obvious in the rural sector.

Furthermore, since the concentration phenomenon is closely linked to the structural heterogeneity of Latin America, in the economic sphere productivity strata with substantial differences one from the other were taking shape, but the important and decisive fact is that the backward sectors contained significant portions of the labour force and of the total population.

An approach of this type stresses the fact that the phenomenon of marginality is not an exclusively urban phenomenon, created by the difficulties of insertion into the city, but that it also takes place in rural areas, since it is more a matter of exclusion and perpetuation of negative conditions.

/1. Urban



1. Urban youth from marginal groups or in a situation of critical poverty

As stated above, urban poverty is currently defined by the contradictions of the structural transformation of the global society, which has not lacked a growth and development process but has been accompanied by a synchronization between the dynamics of demographic growth, the "expulsion" of agricultural workers and the capacity of incorporation of the industry and services in urban areas. In other words, the speed of the urban growth is out of proportion to the increase in the resources necessary for an economic development of the cities, which is reflected in an imbalance in the composition of urban employment, with problems of generalized underemployment and low productivity in much of the economically active urban population. There is a marked irregularity of work in some sectors, as occurs especially in construction, although it is to be found also in other occasional services. Irregularity of work is in fact another form of underemployment, since people's working capacity is not totally utilized during the course of the year. In short, a large sector of the urban population are in jobs outside of the modern sector of the economy, and manage to find work only in sporadic activities, intermediary activities in the retail trade or the provision of unskilled and frequently expendable services.

Young people belonging to these groups are obliged to work at a very early age, frequently before 14 years of age, because of the distressing economic situation of their families, but in fact they only manage to insert themselves into casual jobs or jobs of a level as low as or lower than that of their older relatives, and thus a circuit is created in which they are trapped. The overwhelming majority have an educational level lower than completed primary education, which makes it nearly impossible for them to find a way out of that cycle.

They generally have no access to any type of technical education or professional training, since in cases where such options do exist, they tend to belong to the most modern area of the economy and therefore favour those who already have some level of formal education. Other training systems exist which are linked to firms, and these young people do not appear to have a fixed connection with them. Nevertheless, the main point is that youth belonging to marginal social groups cannot even make real use of their period of basic education. The type of teaching and transmission of knowledge in our countries, even in basic education, presupposes certain skills which are acquired in the family unit; for example some abstract ideas which make up the educational curriculum are comprehensible only if they have some concrete reference in the sphere of social experience of the person receiving the teaching. Obviously this is not the case for youth of marginal groups, whose extra-curricular socialization appears totally divorced from the assumptions of formal socialization. As a result, despite the time they do spend in school, they do not succeed in overcoming their semi-illiteracy. To these difficulties may be added the irregularity of their school attendance, their generally low levels of health and many other factors which affect their potential performance.

/a) Negative

a) Negative socialization and abnormal behaviour

The socialization of youth from marginal urban families presents a set of signs of deterioration. The families in these social strata experience the temporary absence of the head of household for work reasons, the nearly permanent absence of the mother or father, due to the efforts required for satisfying basic needs and difficulties in socializing their young members because of the socio-cultural gap between the experience and education of the youth and their parents. In short, the ability of the family to act as a support unit for the young generations is extremely weak, and its defects are not remedied by collective social services. In addition, the relationship of marginal youth to culture is damaged, in the first place because most of them have no primary education, and in the second place because there are no cultural activities in centres which would give them the opportunity to express themselves and access to the advantages of universal culture.

Although it is true that, due to the economic situation of the family, they have to delay their own consumer aspirations in order to meet the basic needs of the family group, the dominant culture imposes a strong validation of consumption which seriously affects the behaviour of marginal youth. The pressures to consume fall heavily on these young people, but it is mainly a desire that is involved, since the very lack of resources impedes their access to a real mass consumption.

Thus, the pressure of advertising produces distortions in the youth subcultures, since they provide a large group susceptible to cultural manipulation. Advertising and the communications media tend to give form and content to these subcultures by offering them an integrated body of symbols and representations. Marginal urban youth in particular are inclined to see advertising and consumption as representing their basic psychological needs which are unsatisfied in the family. From this arises another source of tension which widens the generation gap.

If to a certain extent the relations between young people and adults in Latin America are characterized by an intergenerational confrontation, among marginal youth the signs of rejection often take the form of asocial or antisocial behaviour. Uneducated marginal youth who do not have jobs, whose families are unable to integrate them, who are often left out of specific social policies, and who finally, lack even a physical space in which to carry out their activities, tend to organize themselves into peer groups disconnected from any social organization and tend to confront society with escapist actions.

Thus, the phenomena of juvenile delinquency and drug addiction reflect the problems and contradictions of the societies into which these young people are inserted. Besides the contradictions of the adult world and the cultural manipulation to which they are subjected, marginal youth have other causes of such behaviour, which have to do with the difficult and distressing economic and social situation in which they live, and under which circumstances drugs are used to dull hunger, coldness or the boredom of inactivity, or as a way of temporarily escaping the harsh reality of their existence. The obvious economic determinations explaining these abnormal types of behaviour are the critical poverty levels at

/which they

which they live, aggravated by the circumstances of the current crisis, the high unemployment rates and the drop in family incomes. The social manifestations are the splitting-up of families, school desertion, leaving the home and juvenile vagrancy.

b) Political exclusion

But we cannot fail to point out that one of the most important elements of marginalization is that of political exclusion, since young people in fact do not participate in basic decision-making. In the majority of the cases -as pointed out- in addition to the fact that they have cultural, educational or whatever other type of deficiencies, they are not social actors because in Latin America the common situation is one of political inertia, and those groups lack powerful organizations and resources to help bring their interests to bear on society as do other social groups. Nevertheless, there are some examples of the beginnings of mobilization, and young people would probably play a role in this connection. Many of the examples we know of respond to forms of activation from outside. Nevertheless for a series of motives, certain forms of community would appear to be coming into existence, arising from an experience such as type of location in the urban space, and making them aware of the exclusion and segregation imposed upon them.

2. Rural youth: margined youth in transformation 13/

The rapid rate of urban growth and development compared with rural and the selective migration of young people to the city combine to make the young people who remain in the country a sector that is increasingly left out of modernization and development. It is a fact that educated rural dwellers migrate to the urban area in greater proportion than those with little or no education, and this exacerbates the increasing gap in the educational levels of urban and rural youth. Those who remain in the country drop their studies earlier, marry at an earlier age and become integrated into the economically active population in the lowest-qualified and remunerated tasks, generally as non-remunerative housewives or farmhands, and thus lose all hope of escaping the vicious circle of critical poverty through study or occupational mobility. Much of rural youth, then, constitute persistent centres of poverty, low education and deficient social integration, with a strong tendency to transmit the same situation to their own children.

a) The transformation of the world of rural youth

Within this general picture of growing differentiation as regards the modern urban sector, rural youth have been affected by profound -and at times contradictory- changes in their environment, which are making them a generation that is very different from that of their parents, and which gives rise to several unknown factors concerning the real meaning of the processes which characterize the new rural generation. Although they are increasingly less educated than the young people who grew up in or moved to the urban centres, they are also much more educated than the previous rural generations. In some countries this difference has been taking on spectacular significance in recent years. This is of particular

/importance if



importance if account is taken of the qualitative jump which it means for many young people to cross the threshold of learning to read, write, and do mathematical problems, compared with the illiteracy of the majority of their parents.

Furthermore, the current rural generation is less a peasant and agricultural generation in terms of their economic insertion. The deterioration of the soil and demographic growth are forcing large numbers of young peasants to supplement working the land with trade activities or salaried work, which frequently involve temporary and cyclical migrations to areas of modern commercial agriculture or to the cities. The children of agricultural wage-earners, too, are finding that their economic insertion has changed radically: with the nearly total elimination of the more permanent and paternalistic relationships of the plantation, their relation to the agricultural enterprises of today is of an impersonal, clearly monetary and occasional nature, since the demand for day labourers generally occurs in short periods of sowing and harvest. In some countries, the benefits of the agrarian reforms, whatever their specific form, have represented an attempt to increase the capacity to produce a food surplus for the urban population. Finally, the development of the infrastructure and the non-agricultural economy in rural areas provides rural youth today with some totally new economic alternatives, due to the existence of better communications, new trade and service activities, the presence of agro-industrial activities, and the growing importance of State institutions and agencies in rural areas.

Perhaps the area of greatest conflict and contradiction for rural youth today is the cultural area. Having transcended the situation of a world apart characteristic of rural life previously, due to the expansion of formal education, geographic mobility and the penetration of urban mass communication structures and economic activities into the rural area, young people have a view of the world, value scales and life and consumption styles that are very different, and even contrary, to those handed down to them by their parents. Nearly all of them manage to learn something of the city and of modern urban life; many emigrate, but others, driven by urban unemployment and underemployment and by their insertion into the lowest echelon of the hierarchy of urban stratification, return to the rural environment, having experienced a permanent change in their perception of the reality in which they move.

#### b) Indigenous youth

In several countries which still contain a strong traditional rural presence, indigenous youth live in an extreme situation of a growing gap between their socio-economic level and that of the urban population. Nevertheless, the gap is smaller than that of previous generations. The indigenous population is decreasing as a proportion of the total population, but growing in absolute terms and tending to grow or maintain itself as components of the rural population in countries where they have a strong presence, and especially as part of the critical-poverty stratum. Not only are they generally the poorest in the rural population and those who migrate least to the urban area, but they also run up against language barriers, cultural barriers and discriminatory treatment, a situation which is associated with the persistence of a semi-colonial type of relationship. Due to language difficulties and deficiencies in the educational services in the indigenous rural

/areas, many

areas, many of them do not acquire functional reading, writing and arithmetic skills, although they are attending school for a longer period of time. Indigenous women in particular, because of their traditional cultural insertion, in which they fulfil economic roles that are vital to the survival of the family and because of the growing need for them to assume the functions of the more active members of the household who migrate periodically in search of work, are continuing to be the subsector with the greatest illiteracy of all.

However, the intergenerational transformation is of enormous magnitude. The learning of Spanish, some education, and the extensive knowledge of the non-indigenous and non-peasant world place indigenous youth at a great distance from the situation of their parents. A small minority, very important from the structural point of view, has succeeded in attaining relatively high educational and economic levels, and constituted a new élite. In past decades, this type of mobility also included processes of acculturation, denial of the indigenous identity, and imitative adoption of non-indigenous behaviours and values. Recently, and increasingly, there has been a marked tendency on the part of young people to revalidate the indigenous culture and institutions, which in some contexts is expressed by an attempt to separate the ethnic identity from a particular socio-economic stratum; in others, it causes an effort to be made towards strengthening the social autonomy of the ethnic groups and destroying the mechanisms of domination which have perpetuated their critical poverty.

These socio-cultural changes and contradictions have daily far-reaching impacts on the traditional institutions of participation and production. While foreign value scales and new economic demands generally undermine and impair traditional structures, the indigenous groups themselves are making efforts to take advantage of their own institutional resources for the purpose of development from within, which implies readapting them and often changing their form and content. These changes frequently give rise to generational confrontations, in which indigenous youth challenge the authorities of their elders and question their ability to manage in the modern world.

This acute situation of confrontation with adults who are less integrated into the urban culture affects not only indigenous youth but the majority of rural youth today. The latter differ from urban youth in that with a certain regularity rural youth occupy positions of leadership, not only of youth social movements, but of community, labour and even political movements. The high proportion of almost complete lack of education and political and economic knowledge of the city among the parents' generation in some circumstances even makes the older adults legitimize the authority of the young people who are the only ones with the necessary knowledge and skills to defend the interests of the group in the current situation of interpenetration of the rural and urban systems. Both in the context of demand mainly for services and access to urban-type goods, and in movements demanding more equitable land distribution or forms of greater State support for the peasantry, rural youth, despite their many shortcomings with respect to their urban peers, have a great potential as political actors at the head of the growing mobilization of the rural masses, since they have an increasingly higher educational level and better knowledge of the political-social system. In those countries where the rural population has a strong presence and absolute growth, the new generation of rural youth is beginning to play an

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important role in the search for new styles of development that are viable for all the lower sectors. Even in those where the rural youth population is decreasing, due to the strategic nature of agriculture for helping to satisfy the demand for food from a growing urban population; and because of prohibitive import costs and the fact that there is a large-scale crisis in modern agriculture due to acute energy needs and other factors, the peasantry will probably obtain greater bargaining power which will enable it to improve its current position.

## VII. COMPLEXITY OF THE CURRENT SITUATION AND FUTURE PROSPECTS

### 1. Structural problems

The economic transformation of the Latin American countries has been very unequal, which has helped aggravate the differences between the relatively more or less developed countries. In addition, from a social point of view, the benefits of the progress - where there was progress - have tended most of the time to be distributed very inequitably among the different social strata. In many cases the concentration of income has intensified, widening even more the difference between high and low strata in the majority of countries. As several studies have shown, in some cases the distribution has been strongly concentrated at the highest economic-social strata, and there have even been relative losses in the share of nearly all the lower strata. In others, despite generalized growth, the middle and high groups have obtained greater benefits in relative terms. An illustration of this is the fact that in 1960 the average per capita income of the richest 10% was 33 times higher than that of the poorest 20% of the population, while in 1975 that average income was 41 times greater.

Nevertheless, despite the fact that from the point of view of income facts such as the above may be cited, in recent decades the transformations in the economic structure have undeniably had an impact on the structure of the occupational stratification system, which has meant mobility and social transformation of undeniable importance and, which, in addition, have certainly had impact on the forms of social coexistence.

Ample reference has been made above to the demographic changes, the changes in the occupational structure and the influence of the educational transformation. Those processes and other accompanying processes have brought about the internal alteration of the different social groups and the creation of new groups, all of which forms the current social stratification of the region, and in which process it should be emphasized that, when a clearly urban population is formed, the priority social demands will not basically be - as in the recent past - demands for "integration into urban life" but for distributive policies which will correct the urban inequalities themselves; in addition, a fact that a growing percentage of the population is having access to basic levels of education indicates that there will be greater homogeneity in such demands.

/In some



In some countries the different types of changes that occurred resulted in social mobility processes and even different relative weights of social groups which brought about the replacement by one group of the other in terms of position occupied in the global power system. The region has not been free from political-social alterations which introduced radical changes into the stratification system. In others, the alterations did not change the relationship among the groups, but it did give rise to ascending or descending mobility processes and important internal alterations within each stratum. In still others, the concentration of power in certain institutional communities brought about significant changes in the composition of social power, either by gradual linkage between those communities and the pre-existing higher social groups, or because the power made possible the insertion of others.

In some cases, and under favourable economic circumstances, social mobility processes were recorded which enabled a greater number of persons to be incorporated into the middle and high levels of the social stratification pyramid, due to the expansion and differentiation of the corresponding positions. In other cases, and sometimes together with the above, mobility processes took place in sectors closer to the social base. However, since all this was linked to more or less favourable economic processes, it might be now wondered what will be the future scenario of the processes of change in social stratification in a generalized context of recession.

## 2. The impact of the crisis, its effect on youth

Everyone is aware of the fact that at the beginning of the 1980s, Latin America is confronting its worst economic crisis since the great depression of the 1930s. The indicators register marked decreases in global production, an increase in the already-high open unemployment and underemployment rates, acute inflationary processes, severe balance-of-payments crises, abrupt decreases in international reserves and an increase in the external debt and of the payment of interests on that debt at untenable levels. Many of the anti-recessionary policies to date have been reflected in programmes of contraction which imply devaluations, reduction of social services and decrease in public spending and employment.

For the purposes of this document, it should be pointed out that although the effects are more or less serious according to the social stratum involved, within each stratum certainly the most affected would be young people. The decrease in economic activity -if there is not a radical change in policies in that area- will mean a drop in supply of jobs and therefore the non-absorption into the labour market of young people seeking to enter it and who are reaching unprecedented levels in absolute terms. In addition, if an attempt is made to act in terms of checking or reducing social services, this will affect the young people who have resorted to this sector as a source of work, and especially young educated women, who, as we have seen, represent a considerable percentage in services such as education and health.

If there is a radical drop in urban activities, such as some data appear to indicate, the processes of rural-urban mobility will be checked, with the consequent repercussions.

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Furthermore, because competition for jobs is increasing at a time when available posts are decreasing, an effect of downward compression is produced, which accentuates the existing trends and forces those who have a higher educational level to opt for lower-prestige occupations, driving out those with relatively less education, and thus on down to those young people who have only a rudimentary education, a situation which would practically exclude them from the job market.

The economic crisis can very often make itself felt as both a political and social crisis, and if that occurs, the conflicts would tend to worsen. If youth are the most affected, it is to be assumed that the generational conflict is one of the forms it may take, but the dimension of social legitimacy can also be called into question, if account is taken of the fact that the legitimacy of power relations has tended to rely and is relying more and more on the efficiency of the economic system. The latter aspect of the crisis may relate to the direct relations between the social groups and classes and may also drift towards a weakening of the legitimacy of the State, to the extent that it has long been a tradition for the State to take responsibility for economic management.

It is quite possible, therefore, that a demand may arise, which may be more or less conflictive, for redynamization of the economy, in which the distinctive elements would be: the demand for a social vocation, whose most concrete form would be pressure for redistribution, even in terms of the costs and burdens of the crisis; a development vocation, which will demand economic dynamism and, in addition, a vocation for autonomy, as a correction of the extreme external dependence, which may be expressed as a demand for new forms of internal development and probably with reindustrialization objectives.

With regard to youth, two key topics arise in this context: the possible ability of youth to apply pressure for the alternative style of development to be directed towards satisfying needs. This may be problematic if it is considered that the prevailing model, in its successful phase, distorted the type of needs considered to be important, especially through consumption. And second, the change which youth may bring about in the definition of values, which are expressed as social needs, is a crucial aspect.

Furthermore, the fact that the alternative development which may come about, should mean a development of the person and not only of things, will be closely connected not only with alienation from "consumerism" but also with the degree of creativity and satisfaction achieved in productive activity or economic activity in general, which will depend, among other factors, on the connection that is achieved between levels and forms of education and the incorporation not only into the economic system but into the political and social system as a whole.

It is obvious that all the problems described will occur in specific forms in the different countries of the region, due to the structural heterogeneity of the latter; however, it can be assumed that they will generally be present in one form or another.

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## VIII. THE UNCERTAINTIES OF THE FUTURE

### 1. Lack of a clear idea of the direction of the change

In Latin America, the years following the Second World War were not only marked by objective transformations in the economic and social structure in the majority of the countries, but also by a strong awareness of this change. Questions concerning what was changing and the nature of that change, despite the ideological differences, appeared to have some common replies. Furthermore, the question from what point and in what direction change was occurring was resolved in the idea of transition between the traditional society and modern society, or, in a fuller and more flexible form, in the idea that the change was taking place from an agrarian society to an industrial or urban society. The former was based on the economic and social structure of the plantation and the latter on that of the business firm.

Today we lack such expressive images as the previous ones, and perhaps our collective awareness of the change is more diffuse than the preceding one. There is often some concern with regard to the problems which the previous process did not succeed in fully resolving or even worsened, such as poverty, marginality, the social distribution of benefits, and many others, but with no implication of the awareness of a transition to another stage or situation. Expressed schematically, the awareness of the problems is outweighing the awareness of change.

In a somewhat confused way, therefore, there is a conviction that the society of the future will be different from that of the present, although attempts to indicate precisely how those differences will manifest themselves have not been successful. The concerns appear to assume three positions which are interrelated but stress different aspects. The first relates to technology and its transformation, where the problem lies in the new skills required to make proper use of it, but also in the type of societal organization those skills presume, to the extent that all technique is a form of human action. The second believes that a questioning of values is taking place, the causes of which are multiple and complex, which fulfilled a fundamental role in the current style of civilization, but which would be reaching the end of their validity. The third position is represented by those who believe that innovation lies in the emergence of new societal models, deriving from deep-seated needs and not resolved by the known models of society.

But whatever the form in which a different society and future are envisaged, the motivating factor would appear more to be a dissatisfaction with the present than a joyous attraction to the future. Consequently, it has been emphasized that the search for an alternative style of development has been hastened because of the dissatisfaction produced by the prevailing model.

It may be inevitable for the time being for our picture of the change to be confused and for our feeling of crisis with respect to the present situation to become more acute precisely for this reason. Nevertheless, what is important in a process of change is mainly the transformation of the social structure and especially the emergence of a new social stratification and the creation of new ways of living. An analysis of the changes in the former and of its foreseeable trends, as can be observed in the youth of today, can provide some clues for the interpretation of the elements of the future change.

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The concerns expressed above also apply to cultural phenomena, which, it is claimed, follow too closely upon the transformations taking place at the level of social and economic structures. It can plausibly be argued that important phenomena of change took place during the urbanization, industrialization and modernization processes referred to above, at different times for each country. In such cases, the cultural options appeared to be those implied by the difference between rural culture and modern urban culture. The contrasting societal archetypes, and therefore the cultural figures linked to them, were those represented by the plantation and the firm, respectively; the structural transition, therefore, corresponded to a cultural transition. The problems consisted of learning how much was change and transformation and how much continuity. In the current situation, the picture of the future is much less precise, although this does not mean that criticism of tradition is not helpful and that there is not a process, although a confused one, of dissolution of certain standards.

Probably the phrase best describing the situation is the old idea of a "cultural malaise", and therefore the presence of a relative confusion and disorientation.

In such situations a positive attitude often arises, of critical review or revalidation of the cultural origin or source to which it is necessary to return in order to find an orientation. What this means is that, although in other periods the clarity of the picture of the future made it possible to form clear judgements on the value or lack of value of the existing culture, at the present time the relationships would appear to have reversed, since an attempt is being made to postulate dimensions of the future on the basis of a cultural judgement. It is therefore possible to hope that what will predominate is critical youth rather than youth which conceive themselves as the carriers of an already nearly pre-figured future.

It is difficult to discuss the current relationship of youth to the culture because there is not much specific information available; however, reference should be made to some of the problems observed. One of them is that of cultural demand, which is obviously not only a request for access to the advantages of the culture, although it is clear that this element will continue to be important. There will probably be a change in the demand, deriving from the critical attitude referred to above, and in addition, the culture will probably tend to be conceived as a conscious ideal rather than merely the existing one. The culture can then preferably present itself as a form of consciousness and the key problem to be solved will be that of how the individual consciousness and social consciousness can be joined culturally. Basic phenomena for Latin American countries, such as the idea of freedom, will have to be elaborated in terms of the relationship between those forms of consciousness. The search for individual spiritual autonomy requires reflection on its relationship to the community and the type of manifestation which that autonomy may find in a very concrete form of society. And it should not be thought that these ideas are very obtruse, since they constitute the basis for options of democracy, participation and social responsibility.

With regard to specifically Latin American topics, one fact which should be taken into account is the obvious superimposition of cultures, an area in which some countries have not been able to achieve a true integration and in which some

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cultures tended to be excluded or subdued. The problem has been becoming more acute in recent years, and rather than being thought of in terms of a smooth and even cultural integration, different cultural principles are considered to be in conflict and even competition in the attempt to lay the groundwork for the nation.

Possibly as a result of this heterogeneity of cultures is the feeling, so often referred to by Latin Americans, that we are dealing with what is formless, undone, unfinished or still being formed. As expressed by Octavio Paz, in our Latin America, the act of being is almost one of intellectual violence. Building an identity appears to be one of the most serious cultural challenges for youth, especially if account is taken of the fact that in recent years they have been exposed, mainly through consumption, to foreign patterns and models.

## 2. Concern for youth as a reflection of uncertainty

At certain times some kinds of juvenile behaviour, which we consider to be more or less eccentric, attract the attention of society as a whole and require some explanation. In other cases, doubts concerning the society itself as a whole lead to concern with the topic of youth. The latter would appear to be the current situation, in which an attempt is being made to understand an uncertain future through the current behaviour of youth. The uncertainty of the future goes hand-in-hand with a diffuse awareness of crisis, where the continuity of what exists is not assured, and even more, we have no exact certainty of its value. As a result, when society is at a turning point it begins to be concerned about its youth. Juvenile behaviour itself often gives signs of crisis phenomena, since the social standards prevailing up to that point appear to be going through a process of dissolution and even destruction. It is a question of well-known historical phenomena, of destruction of tradition through the eruption of phenomena of structural change or of new events removing the basis for habitual behaviour, or of processes involving internal decay of tradition or of exhaustion of the values which sustained it.

It is in the area of education that the problems appear with most intensity. Why can the future -which is equivalent to saying youth- not simply be moulded according to the image of the present; it is obvious that such a doubt arises when one is doubting oneself. In the search for an option, it is feasible to resort to the models provided by other societies, which are supposed to be better than our own or more advanced, and this has often been attempted and been done, but by a strange paradox would seem to be the least advisable solution at the present time. It should be borne in mind that the societies which we call the "more developed" societies are becoming increasingly distrustful of what they have achieved, and some of their segments even believe that the less developed societies have managed to keep the secret of more valid lifestyles than those which they themselves have achieved.

Though there are doubts concerning the true value of the existing models, there is also distrust of a simple leap of the imagination towards the proposal of a utopia. It is true that an attempt is being made today to recover the value of the utopia, but also -although it may appear to be a contradiction in terms- there has been an attempt to give it the characteristic of concreteness. It is

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a question, say its proponents, of imagining the future on the basis of the present reality, but not in order to subject it to the latter, but rather as an opportunity to change it. Much of the present is fixed and inevitable, but there is also a need for responding to the present in a future perspective. From a demographic point of view, the mere intensification of the existing trends shows that to a great extent, it is not a question of finding formulas for adapting to them, but for correcting and changing them; the same occurs with the trends of the economic structure or with the existing type of social and cultural development. Diagnoses and predictions at the current time are pointing to the needs for change and transformation more than the possibility of continuity between the present and the future.

Expectations for change are generally placed in young people, because almost by definition they are supposed to be less tied to the past and to the present than adult generations. But this idea of youth as a "tabula rasa" is not very definite or even appropriate. Elements of the future, unlike those of the present, do not necessarily have to be a negating imaginative effort. The dimensions of a different future are very often found in history itself, as non-realized or simply repressed elements. The role of youth, in addition to their creative capacity, also lies in their capacity to reassume and realize the other elements of history - and especially those of their own history- which up to now existed only as a possibility.

## IX. IMPORTANCE OF GENERATIONAL RELATIONSHIPS IN A SOCIETY IN TRANSFORMATION

### 1. The relationship between generations

The time of change which Latin America is experiencing, as confused and uncertain as it is, requires social protagonists. We are not trying to postulate an exclusive role for youth in such a process, but we do want to call attention to a few facts which should be borne in mind. The existence of a certain amount of conflicts or tensions between the different generations making up society at a given moment is relatively common. Juvenile behaviours are often explained as the result of a certain moral rebellion created by the discrepancy between the values declared and transmitted in socialization and the values -or the real behaviour- manifested by those in power and by the adult generation in general. Such a "rebellion against parents", to use the psychoanalytic terminology, may be accepted as a more or less normal event with not very dangerous consequences, since the acceptance of reality is the step subsequent to the appearance of that symptom. Defiance would come to be a kind of growth trauma, but as such, surmountable. The situation is different when the adult generation itself lacks trust in its normative guidelines and ways of constituting social relationships. The present time, as has been implied, has a large measure of such characteristics, aggravated by the influence of the crisis, the repercussions of which are not only economic but extend to the social, political and cultural areas.

The problem tends to become more acute if it is postulated that the relationship between the youth and adult generations is acquiring a particular direction in the region. Given the marked increase in education in the last 20 years, young

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people are much more educated than adults. Although most adults above 50 years of age are illiterate, young people are literate and for some categories of youth, the distance between the education of the parents and their own covers a range from incomplete primary education through a university degree. In addition, the form of insertion into economic activity is changing; it has been shown how large groups of young people are preferring to incorporate themselves into the service sector, in which organizational rationality and modern technology are playing a growing role.

It is among young women that the most marked changes are being recorded in the area of education, rates of participation in economic activity and greater differences between the adult and youth generations with respect to insertion into manual or intellectual occupations.

The expansion of education and the transformation of occupational structures have brought about high mobility between different age groups, with a very high rate of change between generations hardly 10 years apart.

Another fact which should be pointed out, besides the already referred-to distance between parents and children with respect to educational levels, and which can be influential in the relationship between the generations, is what could be termed "modernization distance". The transformation -not only technological- as regards the degree of modernity has been accelerated in recent years, and the rate of change is probably increasing still more. The family, which was the vehicle of modernization par excellence, is encountering difficulties in fulfilling such functions, since adults often possess neither the skill nor the knowledge required for carrying out new functions important in modern life. In addition, for various reasons, the paternalistic Latin American culture is ceasing to be as solid as it was, so that socialization is tending to take place among peers and, if not a total break, at least a certain estrangement is being created from the older generation.

The dynamic of the change caused young people to have an image of potentiality, growth and mobility. They have been the main participants in the modernization processes, as distorted as the latter may have been. Young people have experienced rapid urbanization, considerable integration into the mass communications systems, into broadened forms of participation in consumption -independently of the negative features which this assumed in some cases- massification of education, the importance of the presence of women in the society, which among other things means that the young generation has double weight in the society of today, since women are becoming more and more active in it, while in the adult generation men were often the only active ones.

Nevertheless, because of the effects of the crisis, it is feasible to assume that the rate of such transformations will decrease considerably. In any social process, the abrupt transformation of collective states of mind based on great expectations, to shared frustrations, has had an effect on the types of social mobilization of the affected group.

## 2. Options and generational conflict

The current situation will certainly highlight the theme of options with respect to alternative styles of development. Perhaps it is predictable for the discussion of alternatives to take on the form of a conflict, although not necessarily for it to be extremely acute. The conflict may assume the form of a generational conflict, and it would not be the first time that that happened in our countries. It must be foreseen that not only will different options exist, but that in addition the mechanisms and institutions through which the change had been accustomed to take place, will appear to be somewhat questioned. In that case, the conflict with youth would acquire a double dimension; conflict over a particular option and conflict with the institutional political system in force.

Conflict over the political system may acquire particular importance. Progress at the educational level, particularly observable among youth, make it foreseeable that there will be a lesser impact of certain kinds of political mobilization in Latin America, such as those provided in the past by charismatic leaders. Modes of participation will probably relate to forms of organization. Nevertheless, in few Latin American countries the presence of a modern political party structure may be observed, and even a certain tendency towards perpetuation of the traditional parties, often with difficulties in creating forms more representative of the new social forces which have been emerging. As we know, it was and is fairly common for the party structure to be based on a system of leadership of noteworthy persons, close to "caudillismo" and power groups were constituted whose conception of politics -imposed by those circumstances- often tended towards manipulation. The political-juridical institutional structure also frequently presents problems; it was generally designed to give account of phenomena of slow transformation and even in some cases to moderate the speed of the changes, whence its difficulties in responding to profound social changes and the danger of crisis in which it is finding itself to the extent that the political process is becoming radicalized.

The difficulties of participation, the feeling that the existing political system might not show the flexibility necessary to meet the emergencies of the current economic situation, may cause young people to have an attitude of breaking with the traditional political system, the repercussions of which are difficult to predict.

## X. YOUTH AND THEIR ROLE IN PROCESSES OF CHANGE

### 1. Youth as a social movement 15/

The problem of options concerning the future implies not only the need for possible orientations of that future, but also an attempt to understand the probable behaviour of the different social groups with respect to it. It always appears debatable to designate an age group such as youth as a social actor, since as a group it is quite heterogeneous, and there are other dimensions, such as the concrete fact that young people are objectively part of specific social

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groups which make it still more difficult to assume them to be a whole, so that it is preferable to refer to working-class youth, rural youth, students, etc.

Nevertheless, there are some reasons for considering youth in Latin America to be a social movement; although a specific group -students- has most often been its protagonist; however, they have done so by expressing the demands of youth in general and attempting to assume the representation of all those sharing that status.

Furthermore -with no lack of conflicts and perhaps as a result of them-, a positive validation of youth may be observed in Latin American society. This is influenced by the nearly inevitable observance of their numeric significance, but what is more, the assumption of a certain identity between the nature of society as a whole and youth as such. The theme of Latin America as the "young continent" compared with European societies or other cultures, the idea of its being the "continent of the future" could not but influence the formation of a positive image of the role of youth. In addition, for reasons which cannot be dwelt on here, the intellectuals in Latin America have a role comparable to -or which in the words of don José Medina Echavarría, would be the counterfigure of- what in other areas is performed by the "entrepreneur". The intellectual combined innovative ideas and proposals for a better social arrangement; the image of an Andrés Bello has continued to be paradigmatic. This positive vision of the intellectual was transferred to the University and people connected with the University who, although they may be in conflict, still perform a function which society as a whole is grateful to them for; they are the enlightened consciousness of that society and the bearers of the new ideas which help form the future. For this reason it is always disturbing -although not infrequent- to place a ban on the University. Youth in short, represented most of the time by students, is accepted by the society as a legitimate expression of attempts towards change and transformation.

Furthermore, in the history of Latin America the objectives of the youth movement, as a social movement, have been those of change and social transformation, and this movement's nature of proposal should be stressed, since if a proposal is involved, it is a conscious one, and the youth movement has attempted to affirm that what unites them, more than a common structural condition, is a link of consciousness.

The dimension of the conflict appears to be important in the formation of a consciousness, and although the conflict often acquires a generational nature, it has not stopped at that but has called into question the entire existing social organization. Youth achieves the status of a social movement to the extent that it has been and is capable of producing social and cultural orientations on the basis of its own status and activity, but still more, to the extent that it manages to infuse its practices with meaning. For this reason, youth appears to be a historic actor, guided by normative orientations, in other words, by a project, and this implies that their behaviour is not only the mechanical result of the situations in which they exist, but that it is also culturally-oriented behaviour, hence the value of their ideologies and the significance of analysing them.

Thus understanding



Thus understanding the youth movement appears to have a double relation, on the one hand to the type of specific conflict confronted and on the other, in relation to the project or option being proposed. It is in these terms that the movement defines its own identity, the types of conflicts in which it is situated and the option of meaning that it attributes to its own action.

The youth movement, as a social movement, constitutes a type of social action, which is carried out in the name of a directly-involved sector of society and which possesses a certain level of organization; this makes the conflict become more precise and the movement attain a certain integration. In Latin America in general, the level of organization is provided by the student organizations, although other expressions may be found, such as, for example, parties or partisan youth. In the dimension of the conflict an adversary tends to be designated, perhaps represented by a social group - for example, the oligarchy - although it is very often defined in more abstract terms, such as "imperialism", or "reactionism". Most of the time the conflict attempts to present itself as a problem concerning society as a whole, which enables the behaviour of youth to be distinguished from that of a pressure group.

## 2. The youth social movement in the history of Latin America

Concern over the future behaviour of young people in the region takes on special interest if it is considered that they have very often performed an important role. In tracing the history of the youth movement in Latin America, we find some background for stimulating thought on its role. A brief review of its course of development may be useful for better understanding the possible forms of its future action.

### a) Youth in the 1920s and the Latin American consciousness

Thus understood, the Latin American youth movement has a history which may be dated from the movement known as the University Reform, which originated at Córdoba (Argentina) in 1918 and which managed to extend to most of the countries of the region extraordinarily rapidly. It should be pointed out that in the 1920s, there were not only youth movements of the university type, but that at least in the case of Brazil in 1924, and in Chile at about the same time, there were military youth movements, which in the former country gave rise to the so-called "revolution of the lieutenants".

What should be pointed out, more than the historical particularities of the youth movement in each country, are the themes which appear to be closely connected with the youth movement; one of them was the conflict with the oligarchy, whose leading group capacity and status was questioned and the negative features of its historical action stressed. The second theme was that of the Nation, and in that case reference was made to the fact that large social sectors did not appear to be integrated into it. It was also stressed that the phenomenon of imperialism made so-called national sovereignty an illusion. A third theme was that of the people, with which an attempt was made to assert its claims and in some cases to base the new elements of the Nation on the values of the masses. The idea of a Nation based on the people, autonomous and with endogenous values was opposed to the oligarchic, excluding Nation which tended to favour foreign

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ways. The demand for democracy also appeared to be significant, enabled the oligarchic political form to be opposed and opened the path towards the participation of the people. In the last place, mention should be made of the emergence of a Latin American consciousness which emphasized a common identity beyond the traditional differences and conflicts among countries.

According to the most common interpretations of the youth movement of the 1920s, it expressed the political demand of the middle sectors. Some themes, such as the anti-oligarchical conflict and the demand for democracy, endorse that interpretation, despite the fact that youth and especially university youth do not accept that they are members of the middle class and their criticisms of the middle class are often as virulent as their criticisms of the oligarchy. They prefer to designate themselves as intellectuals or "intelligentsia", attempting in these terms, like their Russian counterparts, by whom they are influenced, to stress their rootlessness and condition beyond the immediate interests of specific social classes and groups.

The importance of literature in the formation of the youth ideology is of interest. On the one hand the pursuit of literature attracts young people, but in addition, a renovated literature develops certain topics which are essential to them, such as a new understanding of Latin America, which is discovered in its immensity and in its popular literary characters, who cease to be picturesque and become protagonists.

There is also a strong generational awareness, expressed in an idealization of youth and in a validation of the youth status, which even extends to the entire continent which, in opposition to old Europe, considers itself to be the bearer of the future because it is the young continent.

#### b) The problem of political option

The second period in the historical formation of the youth movement occurred between the crisis of 1929 and the beginning of the Second World War in 1939. One topic which had been examined earlier, as the result of the horrors of the First World War, takes on a very generalized dimension. This is the crisis of liberalism, whose not only political but also economic effectiveness was refuted by the effects of the crisis of 1929.

What is important is that there was a high degree of politization in those years and that in the case of our topic it related more to the political option of youth than to youth autonomy. The key point lies in the role of the different social classes and the type of relationship between them; it is in that context that the space of youth and particularly students is defined. Although some continue to emphasize the youth-people identity, others are placing it in doubt and trying to stress the class situation of the different youth sectors.

A few historical events took place during the period and were influential, among them and as an example, the Cardenista period in Mexico, which strengthened the ideology of the possibility of national revolution as a valid option for Latin America. In addition, the Chaco War between Paraguay and Bolivia caused the awakening of a national consciousness in the military sectors and youth milieux, which would have an effect some years later.

/We cannot

We cannot fail to mention, in the last place, the impact of the Spanish Civil War, the tragedy of which would intensify the awareness of the political options referred to.

c) Youth and modernization

A third period is that of the young war and postwar generation. The joint participation of the United States and the Soviet Union in the conflict attenuated ideological conflicts; but there also took place during the period a series of already well-known structural transformations, such as the urbanization, and in some countries, industrialization processes. The result of such transformations was the presence of the masses, which became a key factor from that period on; in political terms it meant the emergence of populism, and in some cases that complicated the old order of worker-student unity.

The period in itself is quite complex; progressivism was followed by the cold war, and democratic beginnings were again succeeded by authoritarian forms. For some, the lesson was that an attempt at reform which retained certain formal democratic dimensions, was quite weak in the face of the reaction of the groups affected, both internal and external. For others, the experience indicated that it was necessary to be still more cautious and moderate in the reforms, so as not to give cause for a reaction.

But, in addition to the global political processes, special mention should be made in the second half of the 1950s, of the impact of the ideology of modernization, linked to the structural changes mentioned. In the universities, this implied a tendency to exalt the value of professionalization and the belief that the universities as such could play a key role in the modernization process and have influence in it. The attraction for modernity influenced not only young students but also young people who were incorporated into the world of industry or modernized tertiary activities.

The role and future of Latin America also tended to be perceived in other terms; the option was to become integrated positively into the modern and developed world.

The ideological changes did not take place only among the students; the industrialization and urbanization processes mentioned above brought about the transformation of groups of workers and definitely increased the number of young people incorporated into industrial activity; for many of them the main theme was that of incorporation into the modern world and its symbols, so that a certain ideological change was produced, especially in terms of the perception of an identity of interests and situations with the middle sectors, and it was often not difficult for them to perceive themselves as such.

d) The conflicts of modernization

The modernization process which took place in many countries not only accentuated contradictions regarding the more traditional sectors, but caused conflicts further on within the modernization itself. Furthermore, opposing political, economic and social options were coming into being, such as the Cuban

/Revolution, the



Revolution, the Alliance for Progress, the Revolution in Freedom, and others. The debate related to the alternatives of development and modernization, but was also connected with the conflicts of the latter.

In fact, modernization not only accentuated the well-known structural heterogeneity of Latin America but, since it took place in a context of persistence of traditional dimensions -not only economic, but also social and political- tended in many cases to become distorted. Thus, although some aspects of modernization were accepted, others, which were concomitant or necessary for its proper development, were not. For example, the development of a modern industry implies the emergence of a workers' group with the ability to organize and express its demands and, for its part, the management sector must change its behaviour and the type of relationship it has with its workers; often the positive aspects of the existence of a modern industry were accepted, but an attempt was made to maintain the traditional form of management-worker relationship or there was simply a tendency to deny the validity of a workers' organization.

Difficulties were also emerging among university staff and students. For certain professions, the occupational possibilities were no longer so clear or at least appeared to have declined in comparison to others. One of the forms taken by the conflict was in terms of the debate between university modernization or reform, but in which there were different conceptions of the relationship between the university and society. The reformists took up the old thesis of revolutionizing society through the university, attempting in this way to recover a key role for themselves and for the university as a whole. The modernizers stressed an adaptation of the development process and a function of stimulus for it, and unquestionably spoke for a great number of persons who had found positive and relatively stable forms of insertion into the undeniable development process which the majority of the societies of the region were experiencing.

It is interesting that a third world consciousness, which had a significant impact on youth groups, was attractive precisely during the modernization process; to a certain extent it is indicative of the conflicts which were being created and of the set of contradictions which the process itself was emphasizing.

Another extremely interesting ideological phenomenon was the effect of the processes of revolutionary change on power, which, because they took place in Latin America once again emphasized the protagonist role of youth, given the importance of the youth sector in those processes. Some widely-diffused themes were: the exemplary nature which the behaviour of youth was supposed to assume; their rebellion was mainly to be an example for other social groups; a vanguard function was also assumed for young people, the broader formulation of which was the idea of the new man, which youth was to foreshadow. The foundation of youth behaviour was a strong emphasis on the ethical and moral dimensions, which took precedence over more specific determining factors of youth status.

### 7/3. Possible

### 3. Possible themes of the current youth movement

This brief account of the history of the Latin American youth movement indicates that it is not inappropriate to think of the youth of the region as a social movement, in the sense that they are not only attempting to achieve self-identity but that they are also considered to be the bearers of a process of social change. To this extent they are political actors. It is true that they are not a homogenous group or one having a single ideology, but neither is any social movement. The topics which Latin American society as a whole has raised, revolution, democracy, modernization, development and others, have a privileged area of discussion among youth. With due regard for the differences, student groups especially constitute a kind of ideological consciousness of society, like intellectuals in other cultures and societies. The diffusion, development and in some cases elaboration of ideologies is closely linked to them, and this role turns them into a key group. Not only do they, as young people, adopt certain values and behaviour orientations which they will transform into concrete actions when they later on become adults, but they are influential as young people. It is not only a question of what will happen with the young people of today when they become adults, but also of what the young people of the near future will be like. In this way viewing youth as a social movement proves to be useful.

A review of the history of the youth movement emphasizes the fact that, despite the particular features of each country of the region, there is a strong coincidence and similarity among the topics which have been of concern to young people. It might be thought that this is not the current situation and, on the contrary, that diversity is tending to increase. A simple glance at the current political situation shows the different options coming into play in groups of countries such as, for example, those of Central America, those of the Caribbean region, with their specific features in the English- or French-speaking Caribbean, the Andean countries, the Southern Cone, etc.; nevertheless, some general problems may be discerned:

#### a) The democratic compromise

With respect to the role of youth in relation to the democratic option, whatever the institutional form and modality it may adopt, the most important question is the social value which the young people attach to such an alternative and the degree of realism with which they raise their demands. The points of interest would be an awareness of the structural conditions of democracy, not in the sense of simply accepting them as limits to democracy, but as a need for change in order to carry democracy further. It might also be asked what the demands and role of young people would be in relation to the deepening and spreading of democracy, both in the area of the economy and in that of society and the political system. The forms of structuring economic relations are most often far from being democratic forms, not only in terms of the distribution of economic benefits, but also in terms of the modes of organization of the production itself.

At the social level, the experience of the family organization, relations between social groups and sectors and forms of socialization, including the formal educational system, are often very far from being a democratic experience. Societies which institutionally acknowledge the value of democracy often deny it in the practice of their social relationships, and youth are in fact particularly

/sensitive to



sensitive to this contradiction. The political system itself, the basis for democratic organization, needs to be made more democratic, and there is no escaping the fact that the forms of real participation in party and political structures are very often far from being the most efficient.

Furthermore, under the operating conditions of the prevailing type of development, whose tendency towards concentration is widely recognized, democratic demands cannot escape that fact and often make it into one of the most frequent themes of the social and political conflict.

In the well-known formulation of Dr. Prebisch,<sup>16/</sup> centre-periphery relations imply that peripheral development appears as a limited development, but with a strong imitative character, both as regards techniques and forms of consumption, and also with respect to institutions, ideas and ideologies. A level of aspirations is therefore spread which, due to the concentrating nature of the economy, are not satisfied. He stresses that the gap between aspirations and capacity of response does not indicate a lag but is inherent to the type of peripheral development. The exaggerated imitation of forms of consumption appears markedly in the higher strata, who attempt to concentrate surpluses in order to have access to them. Peripheral development therefore, becomes excluding and gives rise to a privileged consumer society. However, strong political and social pressures to share the surplus are created, and are brought to bear mainly on the State, the redistributive mechanism par excellence.

The phenomenon raises the contradiction between the concentrating style and the democratic society; this imposes the need to seek a change of style. There is undeniable pressure by certain forms of consumption and their diffusion among different social strata. This phenomenon may be still greater among youth, whose exposure to consumer pressure is a recognized fact in Latin America.<sup>17/</sup>

It may be pointed out with no fear of exaggeration that on the one hand, the difficulty lies in the defective relationship between type of development and demand, which obliges us to think of the true solution as being the search for more efficient forms of development, but also to think about the existence of a certain alienation in consumption. However, the latter arises from more basic alienations; one of them is alienation in work, in which the lack of satisfaction compels a change or the search for one, in other areas, such as consumption. An alteration in consumer interests requires recovering the meaning of work and the social relationships which work involves. The demand for democratization represents not only a demand for a more egalitarian and broader access to consumption, but also a demand for transformation of the most structural forms of the social relationship. This topic is closely linked to an "other development" option which would mean both a break with alienation in work, consumption and the form adopted by social relations.

b) The role of youth with respect to the topic of integration and the Nation-State

The current economic situation is once again raising the urgency of Latin American co-operation and integration as a positive response to the set of problems raised by the crisis of the 1980s. It must be borne in mind that such an objective is being raised at a time when national problems are difficult and still socially

/conflictive. In



conflictive. In many cases the immediately previous economic option meant an accentuation of internal differentiations, both at the level of stratification and of culture, symbols and values. There also occurred a certain transformation in the functions of the State apparatus, which affected the national integration processes given the undeniable role that the latter traditionally fulfils in that aspect. Thus this new posing of Latin American integration is taking place at a difficult moment for the Nation-State.

Attempting to link these topics to the role of youth might appear to be arbitrary, but it is not so arbitrary if we realize that one of the key dimensions is the existence of an ideology capable of revitalizing the topic of Latin American integration, and in this connection, as the very history of the youth movement shows, the latter can make an important contribution.

In order for a Latin American consciousness to be formed, it must be supported by certain institutions which almost by definition are more open than those which have specific national or local concerns. Such is the case of the Latin American university, which has obviously had to respond to national requirements and has also been "open to the world". It is also a well-known fact that university themes have been very similar in the region and have even coincided in time. In addition, there have been some interesting regional experiments in teaching activity and research, which in some cases are pioneer experiments at the world level.

As noted, the topic of integration is being raised at a time when the Nation-State is undergoing a process of redefinition, in which the set of structural transformations which have occurred in recent years are not uninvolved. Among them are: the demographic increase and its consequences, the rapid urbanization process, the distinct significance and historical period in which industrialization has appeared, the expansion of the modern tertiary sector, the rapid transformation of the educational and cultural conditions of the population, the capitalist transformation of agriculture and its impact on immigration, the role of the ideology and of the State with respect to intentionality, all of which has affected the nature of the classes and groups and of their interrelationships. Furthermore, these changes generated new demands, new patterns of behaviour and new loyalties. This latter aspect is significant, because the functioning of the Nation-State implies loyalties with respect to some institutions considered to be basic, among them and of particular importance for the democratic system, are those connected with parties, labour organizations and other institutionalized forms of organization. The picture spread throughout Latin America was that the phenomena of the presence of new sectors would be resolved through incorporation, which certainly might involve conflict, but would nevertheless give rise to a positive integration into the modern world. The particular nature of the current social mobilization process is that it is producing many experiences which may clash with each other, so that the conflicts being produced would tend to cause disintegration rather than integration.

In the context of the current transformations, young people are not being incorporated into the existing adult world, or even into the extended adult world. They will certainly fulfil new roles and occupy new positions. As a result, it may be said that the topic is not only a question of broadening participation in the existing Nation-State, but of redefining the latter as a response to both internal problems and integration needs.

## XI. SOCIETY AND YOUTH

### 1. The relationship of society to youth: socialization

If in the preceding pages we have tried to call attention to the possible role of young people in the process of change confronting Latin American societies, we must also be concerned with the type of problems involved in the relationship of society to young people. Many topics should be raised here, and some have already been touched upon, such as socialization in the world of work, policies or other areas. Nevertheless, it is advisable for now to refer to some crucial aspects whose decisive nature escapes no one.

#### a) Family and socialization: the diversity of situations and problems

The family is generally considered to be the most important of the socialization agents, but in recent years there have been frequent references to its decline as a decisive factor. Although systematic information in the region on the nature and content of this change is scarce, some trends permit preliminary observations to be made.

In the middle classes, families frequently evidence different cultural levels among their generations. This reduces the socializing role of the family and increases the relations among the young people themselves, so that the peer group exercises a high influence in determining future behaviour. Given the speed of social change in the region, families in lower sectors of the middle class and in the lower strata are also not in a position to socialize their young members to participate in the new society which is emerging, because their values, behaviour guidelines and knowledge tend to be inherited from a very recent past. The youth-adult educational gap and the prolonged period of time during which today's youth remain in the educational system, caused the most important socialization area to shift to the educational institution, peer groups and images from the mass communication media, to which young people are widely exposed.

In the case of the most disadvantaged economic and social groups, the problems are serious. In the rural sector there are many examples of temporary work by heads of families who, having become migrant workers, are away from the home for long periods of time; in others the entire family moves, either to find a temporary job or because of a permanent migration, in which cases there is a collapse between the cultural guidelines of the original society and the coming society. There are indications in urban areas that, as a result of the survival strategies of the poor classes, changes are being produced in the area of internal authority and power structures and intra-family legitimacy. In many cases the rate of participation of adult women rises considerably, as does work outside the home, also causing young people to lose the opportunity to be socialized by their parents.

force, and neither education nor the aspirations for it have a correlation for the social position of the family. While in the area of housing or income, for example, the urban groups in the lower strata are satisfied with limited levels, in the area of education their aspirations are infinite. In modest families and using end conditions of work, parents who are illiterate and



The socialization of marginal urban youth is complex and contradictory; the latter because in many senses the transition from childhood to the adult world is so rapid and abrupt that it deprives them of a conventional period of youth. The premature insertion into the labour market, the lack of education and the consensual marriage or union at an early age throw these young people into adult responsibilities and full interaction with grown-ups. However, adolescents who belong to this group continue with their value-formation process, although for reasons of necessity many of them must assume responsibilities typical of adult status.

In families from low strata, interaction and shared activities with parents are practically non-existent. While discussion seems -most often- to be the main method of control in the middle strata, the socialization of young people in the most disadvantaged strata is frequently carried out by resorting to forms of control connected with a type of disciplinary supervision. Agressivity and its social expression appear differently according to the social stratum in which they occur.

b) Importance of education. Its particular significance in Latin America 18/

The difficulties referred to with respect to the family as an effective socialization agent lead us to pay due attention to the educational system, conceiving the latter in a broader sense than that of the mere transmission of skills and knowledges.

Among the various changes denoted in the transition process in Latin America, education is the one which appears most often, and among the various social demands, education is favoured in the aspirations of all social groups.

Without disparaging the planning efforts of the governments of the region, educational progress is above all the result of social mobilization in the sense that the different social groups -at different times- have expressed vigorous aspirations which in one form or another were accepted and channelled by the governments. The social aspirations have been so marked that even those governments who attempted to resist that demand, either for economic or political reasons, were not able to contain it.

When the educational evolution of the region is compared with that of European countries, the most striking phenomenon is that in the latter, the educational aspirations of society accompanied the requirements of the market with respect to educational qualifications of labour, and each social group aspired to obtain the education corresponding to its stratified level in the society, while in Latin America, a revolution in expectations concerning education occurred. Society values education to such a high degree that the demand goes beyond the requirements of the job market for recruiting the work force, and neither education nor the aspirations for it have a correlation with the social position of the family. While in the area of housing or income, for example, the urban groups in the lower strata are satisfied with limited levels, in the area of education their aspirations are infinite. In modest families, with precarious housing and conditions of work, parents who are illiterate and

/have rudimentary



have rudimentary primary education aspire to a university education for their children. The aspiration seems to be untenable if one considers that in those homes, there is no cultural capital or instruments of formation, such as books, and that they will require the economic effort from an early age of the very children who they hope will have such cultural prospects. This discrepancy is usually interpreted as a sign of imbalance between social status and aspirations. However, in its wake are the most important elements of the construction of an alternative style of development of Latin American society.

They are basically of three types: the aspiration to social mobility, the hierarchy of the cultural dimension and the longing for national integration. The political discourse from the declaration of independence on stated that the societies of the New World were making themselves into different societies in which equality was the norm and the social position of individuals depended on their merits and virtues. This statement -despite the fact that reality indicated the contrary- was repeated as the basis of the legitimacy of the political system and assimilated by society, which believed and believes that it is the valid one, which is why education was considered to be the form in which those statements could be made into reality. This on the one hand explains why individuals take responsibility for their limited social achievements; in the surveys carried out in Latin America, interviewees frequently explain their lack of social success on the basis of their low educational level and not because of discriminations to which they might have been subjected as a result of an unfair distribution of social power. But the counterpart of this self-blame is the demand for educational services in order to make the basic political discourse into a reality. Since, on the other hand, the labour market and the recognition of social position awarded a high value to educational capital -which is measured by the high difference of income between educated and non-educated people and the reserving of prestigious social positions for those who have high levels of education- the democratic component of the educational demand found support in those rewards connected to economic aspects and position in society, the value of which grew to the extent that consumption and material welfare gained prestige with the diffusion of the standards of the capitalist society.

The second element is that of the hierarchy of the cultural dimension. In the European societies, culture was associated with the status of a higher social group, and culture constituted a group distinction which was transmitted basically by the family, which among other things manifested itself in the importance of the different forms of speech as an indication of the social origin of individuals. In Latin America, the long cycle of conflicts preceding the State constitution and the succession of economic changes with the consequent partial or total renovation of the higher groups, prevented -with some exceptions- the persistence of a carrier group of a superior culture transmittable through the family. On the contrary, culture was a creation of the educational system; therefore theoretically accessible to all. Becoming educated was a way for a person to acquire a new dimension which was proving to be as or more prestigious than the accumulation of goods. This fact, which was interpreted negatively as contrary to the values of economic development and which was explained by some authors as the result of a transmission of chivalresque models of the Portuguese-Spanish colony, must be interpreted as a value which foreshadows or contains in seminal form the elements which would constitute the key of post-modern societies.

/The third

The third element is national integration. In the societies which originated from international immigration and are composed for the most part of the fusion of multi-racial contributions, gathered together arbitrarily in relations of personalized dependence, the aspiration to constitute the nation was thwarted again and again by the exclusivist tendencies of the groups holding the power. In the oligarchical régimes, the people were disqualified from intervening in government because of their ignorance, which was maintained because of the lack of available education; subsequently, the restrictive discourse of the political bureaucracies or those of the technocratic groups maintained that the complexity of the problems to be resolved qualified only a few to adopt decisions, that is, in both cases the lack of education was resorted to as the formal reason for exclusion in a national, and therefore participatory society. Education remains associated with citizenship, and in some Latin American societies illiteracy excluded people from voting up to the 1970s. But, beyond the legal restrictions to the status of citizen, education was perceived as the best way to be able to participate in the political, that is the national, society.

## 2. The problems of social policy for young people

Despite the fact that some progress may be observed in the region with respect to the social policies designed for youth and that in some cases institutions exist which are devoted exclusively to young people, a number of problems remain to be overcome. Many of them are attributable to more general problems;<sup>19/</sup> for example, the conception of the role of global social policies in development continues to have serious deficiencies. In addition, social policies tend to be fragmented sectorally and have a high degree of dispersion. With respect to youth specifically, the sector concerned with them often occupies a relatively marginal position in the political-administrative structure.

There is no doubt that in the last twenty years there has been obvious progress with respect to how the relationship between social planning and economic planning or the relationships between economic development and social development should be conceived, but the practice often appears to be outdistanced with respect to conceptual formulation, and the strictly economic dimensions are favoured by the implicit supposition that social improvements may be derived from the economic results achieved. Without disregarding the relationship between the two dimensions, an approach of this type tends to consider social policies to be subordinate.

Furthermore, although the field of social policies has widened, the core of those policies continues generally to provide a traditional view which conceives the social area only in relation to the so-called "social sectors", that is education, health, housing and social security. The role of social groups in the development dynamic, their societal options, and the emphasis on people, as an objective of society and as active participants in the formation and transformation of society, are still barely recognized. Social policies, therefore, are hardly considered as a unified body which goes beyond purely sectoral actions, without undervaluing the importance of the latter.

/With regard

With regard to the formulation of national policies on youth, this weakness has meant that while in many cases national plans mention some global objectives with respect to youth and their participation in society, when these references are expressed in terms of aims, they appear unclearly defined, and finally almost disappear, even when operative forms such as specific action programmes are raised. In cases where youth policies do exist, they generally consider only the areas of social welfare, extra-curricular education, utilization of free time and community service.

A second area in which problems are raised is that of the conception of social policies as a set of sectoral actions which are characterized by their dispersion and carried out by various agencies with little or no co-ordination. The consequence of this sectoral fragmentation is that, although there might be a health, education or housing policy, there is no social policy, no integrated social policy directed to specific social groups. The division among the social policies does not take place concerning problems, but according to a differentiation of administrative competences in attending to social needs. As a consequence of the above, the assumption upon which the formulation of social policies is based is that in the first stage of human existence, problems are attended to by the family with the support of the ministry of health, and in cases where there are pre-school activities, the latter are handled by the ministry of social welfare; once children reach school age, it is supposed that they are under the protection of the ministries of education, which supervise both their academic formation and other aspects, while social welfare and the utilization of free time continue to be under the protectorship of the ministries of social welfare or ministries of youth. When that stage is concluded, they become adults and their opportunities depend on economic policy and their protection on the ministries of labour until they reach old age, at which point they are once again in the sphere of ministries of welfare. Cultural actions are understood to be carried out by the ministries of education which act for the mass of pupils, supplemented by a cultural diffusion of museums, theatres, music, etc., directed towards the adult population as a whole.

The result of the sectoral fragmentation of social policies is that there is a wide range of youth needs in the area of health, nutrition, housing, labour training and income which are outside of the protection of the State. In these areas the action carried out by State or private institutions are in most cases conceived to solve problems typical of the adult world. Thus there are health and nutrition programmes designed for mothers to meet the problem of mother-child health. Housing policies, when they are oriented towards the lower strata, attend exclusively to formed families and preferably those which have a substantial number of children, are without housing or have some other specific feature. There is very little instance of housing policies for young couples hoping to start a family, despite the frequency of early formation of households among youth from the lower sectors. For their part, the ministries of the economy, when envisaging their business development policies, rarely leave room for policies aimed at the creation of youth enterprise or youth co-operatives. Finally, when there is an attempt to increase the production and income of farmers, the training programmes are directed towards heads of families; if the attempt is to train labour in a region where an industrial investment is to be made, the objective is to retrain the existing, that is adult, labour, so that it may shift from craft industry to

/industrial production;



industrial production; or if it is a question of helping to mobilize a group so that it may identify its problems and express its demands, the actions are carried out by the community organizations which are made up of heads of families, that is adults.

The sectoral fragmentation of social policy is in turn closely connected to the marginality in the political-administrative structure of the sectors whose specific concern is youth. In general both social policies featuring a massive social integration and those of a selective nature are affected by "clientele" relations between the institutions of the political-administrative structure and the social groups, whether they are large concentrations or specific population groups. Normally these social groups, already connected to existing public institutions, become pressure elements and tend to conserve the type of orientation prevailing in the service. Given the fact that social policies have been fragmented and their extension to youth extremely restricted, access particularly by youth sectors with greater difficulties in organizing themselves, such as marginal urban youth, is blocked by a great rigidity.

The latter circumstance may still be observed in the case of the ministries of education which have direct responsibility for children and young people. It was assumed, in elaborating the policies, that all children and young people would be included in those services. However, as already noted, a high percentage of their "clientele" is actually not included in those services, nor are they attended to by anyone, if account is taken of the large-scale school drop-out rate in the primary educational system and, to a lesser degree, at some level of secondary education. Since these children should be included in the educational process, in cases of marginality within the educational system, they are treated as if they did not exist. When educational policies differing from the formal ones are implemented, as in the case of evening schools, they are elaborated for the education of adults and not to satisfy the educational needs of young people, although young people in the lower sectors often represent more than half of the total enrollment of these institutions.

Finally, account must be taken of the fact that not only must the orientation of the services provided be reformulated. One of the main objectives is that they should provide a high degree of participation of youth, in terms of the inclusion of youth in the decision-making process. It is assumed that they will in this way be able to take on the relevant responsibilities and also collaborate in implementing them. This means recognizing autonomous youth organizations as a valid participant in society's discussions and trusting in the potential creative capacity of young people.

In short, the analysis of the situation and prospects of youth in Latin America raises the urgent need to mobilize social forces in an integrated way in order to meet the problems of youth in the development of the region, including the active participation of young people themselves. There is need for a truly coherent strategy on Latin American youth, which must also take place within the context of a global strategic view of regional development. As the previous analysis has shown, any policies and programmes formulated on youth will have not

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only to be aimed at establishing mechanisms for integrating young people into the prevailing model of development because current economic, social and political conditions do not permit it, but will have to propose the definition of new alternative development styles with respect to youth.

#### Notes

1/ See Adolfo Gurrieri et al. Estudios sobre la juventud marginal latinoamericana, Siglo XXI, Mexico, 1971. Henry Kirsch, "The participation of youth in the development process of Latin America", CEPAL Review No. 18, December 1982, Santiago, Chile. José Medina Echavarría, La juventud como campo de investigación social, ST/ECLA/CONF.20/L.11. Aldo Solari, "Algunas reflexiones sobre la juventud latinoamericana", Cuadernos del ILPES No. 14, Series II, Santiago, 1971. UNESCO/ECLA/UNDP, Alfabetismo y escolarización básica de los jóvenes en América Latina, Buenos Aires, 1980, Desarrollo y educación en América Latina, Buenos Aires, 1981 and La educación y los problemas del empleo, Informes finales, Buenos Aires, 1981; these three studies were prepared in the framework of the project on Development and Education in Latin America and the Caribbean (1976-1981). UNESCO, Youth in the 1980s, The UNESCO Press, Switzerland, 1981.

2/ The information on the youth population was taken from various issues of the Demographic Bulletin prepared by the Latin American Demographic Centre. Also see United Nations, Demographic Indicators of Countries, New York, 1982.

3/ See preliminary study, Indicadores socio-económicos y caracterización del nivel relativo del desarrollo de los países latinoamericanos mediante el análisis de los componentes principales, E/CEPAL/R.328, 1983.

4/ See ECLA, Long-term trends and prospects of the development of Latin America, E/CEPAL/G.1076, April 1979, and Latin American development in the 1980s, E/CEPAL/G.1150, Santiago, February 1981.

5/ See Henry Kirsch, *op. cit.*

6/ The data for 1980 were obtained indirectly from projections elaborated by CELADE.

7/ See PREALC, Mercado de trabajo en cifras 1950-1980, Santiago, Chile, 1982.

8/ See the Statistical Annex and Henry Kirsch, *op. cit.*

9/ See UNESCO/ECLA/UNDP, La educación y los problemas del empleo, Informe final No. 3, 1981. This work was prepared in the framework of the project on Development and Education in Latin America and the Caribbean.

10/ Juan Carlos Tedesco, Algunas características de la educación e industrialización en América Latina, paper presented to the first UNESCO/ECLA/UNDP Seminar held in the framework of the project on Development and Education in Latin America and the Caribbean, Quito, 13 to 17 September 1977.

11/ See UNESCO/ECLA/UNDP, Project on Development and Education in Latin America and the Caribbean, Desarrollo y Educación en América Latina, síntesis general, Vol. I to IV, Informes finales 4, 1981.

12/ See UNESCO, New approaches to rural youth and development in Latin America and the Caribbean, Paris, 1981. John Durston, "Class and culture in the changing peasantry", CEPAL Review No. 16, Santiago, Chile. UNESCO/ECLA/UNDP, Sociedad rural, educación y escuela, Informes finales No. 1, Buenos Aires, June 1981. This work was prepared in the framework of the project on Development and Education in Latin America and the Caribbean.

13/ On current and future problems of Latin American development, see CEPAL Review No. 1, Santiago, Chile.

14/ On the ideological orientations of the student movement, see Juan Carlos Portantiero, Estudiantes y política en América Latina, Siglo XXI, Mexico, 1978.

15/ See Raúl Prebisch, "A critique of peripheral capitalism", CEPAL Review No. 1, first semester 1976, Santiago, Chile.

16/ See Carlos Filgueira, "Consumption in the new Latin American models", CEPAL Review No. 15, December 1981, Santiago, Chile.

17/ See Germán W. Rama, Articulación social y diferenciación educativa en América Latina, paper presented to the seminar organized by FLACSO, Buenos Aires, in April 1983; Germán W. Rama, Transición estructural y educación: la situación de la juventud, seminar organized by FLACSO, 19 to 23 June 1983, São Paulo, Brazil.

18/ See ILPES preliminary study, El Estado y la planificación en América Latina y el Caribe, E/CEPAL/ILPES/R.16, 1980.

19/ For the development of this strategy see: "Draft Regional Plan of Action for Latin America and the Caribbean for the International Youth Year", E/CEPAL/Conf.75/L.3.



### Statistical annex

This Annex contains a series of data on the youth population in Latin America which will provide empirical support for the assertions made in the text in connection with the diagnosis of the situation and needs of youth in Latin America.

The attached tables summarize different present characteristics of Latin American youth and their evolution during the period 1960-1980. On the basis of projections made by the Latin American Demographic Centre (CELADE), some indicators of the size of the youth population of the region in the year 2000 are also presented, and are compared with the population of 1960.

Tables 1, 2 and 3 provide demographic background on youth in Latin America during the period 1960-2000. The information is presented according to a typology establishing three groups of countries: Group A, composed of countries of relatively early urbanization, with low fertility rates and high life expectancy; Group B, composed of later urbanization, with high fertility rates and a relatively lower life expectancy, and Group C, composed of countries with strong polarization.

Tables 4, 5 and 6 summarize the information available on the participation of youth in economic activity, according to urban-rural regions and estimates of the size of the young labour force through the year 2000, by country.

Tables 7 and 8 highlight the speed of the incorporation of young women into the labour force and the changes in the occupational profiles of the last decades in Chile and Panama.

Tables 9 to 12 give an account of the extent of open unemployment among young people by urban-rural area and sex.

The changes in the levels of education during the period 1960-1980 are provided in tables 13 and 14. Table 15 indicates the urban-rural differences in illiteracy as an indicator of the diversity of situations within the youth population.

Table 16 indicates the intergenerational differences (young people vs. adults) in terms of educational levels according to urban-rural area.

Finally, table 17 provides evidence of the speed of the changes in the educational levels within different socio-occupational categories of the youth population of Chile and Panama.

Table 1

## LATIN AMERICA: CLASSIFICATION OF COUNTRIES ACCORDING TO THEIR DEMOGRAPHIC STATISTICS

|                     | Fertility rates |           |           | Gross rates |       | Life expectancy<br>at birth | Percentage of<br>urban population | Per capita gross domestic<br>product at market prices<br>1970 dollars |
|---------------------|-----------------|-----------|-----------|-------------|-------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------|
|                     | 1955-1960       |           |           | 1975-1980   |       |                             |                                   |                                                                       |
|                     | 1955-1960       | 1975-1980 | 1995-2000 | Birth       | Death |                             |                                   | 1975-1980                                                             |
| <b>Group A a/</b>   |                 |           |           |             |       |                             |                                   |                                                                       |
| Argentina           | 3.1             | 2.9       | 2.5       | 21.2        | 8.9   | 69.2                        | 81.6                              | 1 411.6                                                               |
| Costa Rica          | 7.1             | 3.6       | 2.9       | 29.0        | 5.3   | 69.7                        | 45.7                              | 1 001.1                                                               |
| Cuba                | 3.8             | 2.2       | 2.1       | 17.0        | 6.0   | 64.8                        | 66.9                              |                                                                       |
| Chile               | 5.2             | 3.1       | 2.5       | 25.4        | 8.1   | 65.7                        | 78.7                              | 1 044.5                                                               |
| Uruguay             | 2.9             | 2.9       | 2.6       | 20.3        | 10.1  | 69.5                        | 83.8                              | 1 462.4                                                               |
| <b>Group B b/</b>   |                 |           |           |             |       |                             |                                   |                                                                       |
| Bolivia             | 6.7             | 6.4       | 5.5       | 44.8        | 17.5  | 48.6                        | 44.7                              | 382.1                                                                 |
| Ecuador             | 7.0             | 6.3       | 4.7       | 41.6        | 10.4  | 60.0                        | 44.7                              | 729.7                                                                 |
| El Salvador         | 6.8             | 6.0       | 4.5       | 42.1        | 9.4   | 62.2                        | 44.2                              | 428.1                                                                 |
| Guatemala           | 6.9             | 5.7       | 4.3       | 41.1        | 10.9  | 57.8                        | 36.5                              | 559.6                                                                 |
| Haiti               | 6.2             | 5.9       | 5.2       | 41.8        | 15.7  | 50.7                        | 23.1                              | 146.7                                                                 |
| Honduras            | 7.2             | 7.1       | 5.0       | 47.0        | 11.8  | 57.1                        | 38.8                              | 339.7                                                                 |
| Nicaragua           | 7.3             | 6.6       | 5.0       | 46.6        | 12.2  | 55.2                        | 53.8                              | 345.4                                                                 |
| Paraguay            | 6.6             | 5.2       | 3.8       | 36.7        | 7.7   | 64.1                        | 38.6                              | 632.5                                                                 |
| Peru                | 6.9             | 5.5       | 4.6       | 38.6        | 11.6  | 57.6                        | 63.4                              | 677.0                                                                 |
| Dominican Rep.      | 7.5             | 4.8       | 3.2       | 36.7        | 9.0   | 60.3                        | 46.8                              | 560.4                                                                 |
| <b>Group C c/</b>   |                 |           |           |             |       |                             |                                   |                                                                       |
| Brazil              | 6.2             | 4.4       | 3.3       | 33.3        | 9.3   | 61.8                        | 62.8                              | 956.2                                                                 |
| Colombia            | 6.7             | 4.3       | 3.0       | 32.1        | 8.2   | 62.2                        | 66.3                              | 830.6                                                                 |
| Mexico              | 6.8             | 5.4       | 3.3       | 38.3        | 7.8   | 64.4                        | 67.3                              | 1 357.9                                                               |
| Panama              | 5.9             | 4.1       | 2.9       | 31.3        | 6.0   | 69.7                        | 55.3                              | 1 149.5                                                               |
| Venezuela           | 6.8             | 4.7       | 3.3       | 36.9        | 6.2   | 66.2                        | 76.2                              | 1 277.6                                                               |
| Total Latin America | 5.9             | 4.6       | 3.4       | 33.9        | 9.0   | 62.7                        | 63.3                              | 1 007.6d/                                                             |

Source: CELADE, Demographic Bulletin No. 27, January 1981 and ECLA, on the basis of official information concerning the gross domestic product.

a/ Countries of early urbanization, low fertility rate and high life expectancy.

b/ Countries of late urbanization, high fertility rate and low life expectancy.

c/ Countries of high polarization.

d/ Excluding Cuba.

Table 2  
LATIN AMERICA: VOLUME, RELATIVE IMPORTANCE AND GROWTH RATES OF  
THE YOUTH POPULATION (1960-2000)

|                   | Population 15-24 years<br>(thousands) |          |           | Percentage of 15 to 24 years<br>population of total population |      | Average annual<br>growth rates (%) |           |  |
|-------------------|---------------------------------------|----------|-----------|----------------------------------------------------------------|------|------------------------------------|-----------|--|
|                   | 1960                                  | 1980     | 2000      | 1960                                                           | 2000 | 1960-1980                          | 1980-2000 |  |
| <b>Group A a/</b> |                                       |          |           |                                                                |      |                                    |           |  |
| Argentina         | 3 315.7                               | 4 509.4  | 5 366.8   | 16.1                                                           | 16.7 | 1.5                                | 0.9       |  |
| Costa Rica        | 213.9                                 | 509.3    | 598.9     | 17.5                                                           | 23.0 | 4.4                                | 0.8       |  |
| Cuba              | 1 312.5                               | 1 912.8  | 1 554.6   | 18.7                                                           | 19.7 | 1.9                                | -1.0      |  |
| Chile             | 1 382.8                               | 2 326.8  | 2 575.1   | 18.2                                                           | 21.0 | 2.6                                | 0.5       |  |
| Uruguay           | 401.0                                 | 2 476.8  | 519.5     | 15.8                                                           | 16.4 | 0.9                                | 0.4       |  |
| <b>Group B b/</b> |                                       |          |           |                                                                |      |                                    |           |  |
| Bolivia           | 634.3                                 | 1 055.6  | 1 890.1   | 18.5                                                           | 19.0 | 2.6                                | 3.0       |  |
| Ecuador           | 791.0                                 | 1 587.9  | 2 930.6   | 17.9                                                           | 19.8 | 3.6                                | 3.1       |  |
| El Salvador       | 455.4                                 | 956.3    | 1 737.6   | 17.7                                                           | 19.9 | 3.8                                | 3.0       |  |
| Guatemala         | 721.0                                 | 1 449.3  | 2 493.1   | 18.2                                                           | 20.0 | 3.6                                | 2.7       |  |
| Haiti             | 684.0                                 | 1 122.9  | 1 928.6   | 18.3                                                           | 19.3 | 2.5                                | 2.7       |  |
| Honduras          | 363.5                                 | 706.3    | 1 432.7   | 18.7                                                           | 19.1 | 3.4                                | 3.6       |  |
| Nicaragua         | 266.9                                 | 550.5    | 1 057.0   | 18.1                                                           | 20.1 | 3.7                                | 3.3       |  |
| Paraguay          | 316.8                                 | 658.2    | 1 073.8   | 17.8                                                           | 20.8 | 3.7                                | 2.5       |  |
| Peru              | 1 835.1                               | 3 517.2  | 5 840.4   | 18.0                                                           | 20.0 | 3.3                                | 2.6       |  |
| Dominican Rep.    | 591.6                                 | 1 274.4  | 1 813.4   | 18.2                                                           | 21.4 | 3.9                                | 1.8       |  |
| <b>Group C c/</b> |                                       |          |           |                                                                |      |                                    |           |  |
| Brazil            | 13 076.8                              | 25 005.5 | 35 028.1  | 18.3                                                           | 20.4 | 3.3                                | 1.7       |  |
| Colombia          | 2 788.4                               | 5 657.2  | 817 191.7 | 17.9                                                           | 21.9 | 3.6                                | 1.2       |  |
| Mexico            | 6 604.9                               | 14 057.2 | 23 613.9  | 17.9                                                           | 20.2 | 3.9                                | 2.6       |  |
| Panama            | 195.1                                 | 383.2    | 518.9     | 17.8                                                           | 20.2 | 3.4                                | 1.5       |  |
| Venezuela         | 1 295.8                               | 3 277.5  | 5 455.1   | 17.2                                                           | 21.0 | 4.7                                | 2.6       |  |

Source: CELADE projections prepared on the basis of official information.

a/ Countries of early urbanization, low fertility rate and high life expectancy.

b/ Countries of late urbanization, high fertility rate and low life expectancy.

c/ Countries of high polarization.

(1960' 1980' 2000)

Table 3



Table 3

LATIN AMERICA: PERCENTAGES OF TOTAL POPULATION AND YOUTH POPULATION RESIDING IN URBAN AREAS  
(1970, 1980, 2000)

|                    | Percentage of total urban population |      | Percentage of urban population 15-24 years |      |      |      |
|--------------------|--------------------------------------|------|--------------------------------------------|------|------|------|
|                    | 1970                                 | 1980 | 2000                                       | 1970 | 1980 | 2000 |
| <b>Group A a/</b>  |                                      |      |                                            |      |      |      |
| Argentina          | 78.5                                 | 81.6 | 86.0                                       | 75.4 | 78.4 | 83.3 |
| Costa Rica         | 38.8                                 | 45.7 | 59.4                                       | 42.1 | 48.3 | 61.2 |
| Cuba               | 59.6                                 | 66.9 | 78.9                                       | 56.6 | 63.4 | 75.2 |
| Chile              | 75.2                                 | 78.7 | 84.0                                       | 77.5 | 80.5 | 85.5 |
| Uruguay            | 82.0                                 | 83.8 | 86.6                                       | 80.8 | 82.9 | 85.3 |
| <b>Group B b/</b>  |                                      |      |                                            |      |      |      |
| Bolivia            | 38.2                                 | 44.7 | 56.6                                       | 46.1 | 52.6 | 57.7 |
| Ecuador            | 39.6                                 | 44.7 | 56.0                                       | 43.6 | 49.0 | 59.7 |
| El Salvador        | 39.5                                 | 44.2 | 54.4                                       | 44.6 | 49.3 | 59.0 |
| Guatemala          | 34.4                                 | 36.5 | 43.1                                       | 36.1 | 39.0 | 43.4 |
| Haiti              | 19.8                                 | 23.1 | 31.9                                       | 24.6 | 28.0 | 37.8 |
| Honduras           | 33.2                                 | 38.8 | 53.0                                       | 37.0 | 42.9 | 57.1 |
| Nicaragua          | 47.0                                 | 53.8 | 66.0                                       | 49.2 | 56.2 | 67.8 |
| Paraguay           | 37.0                                 | 38.6 | 44.5                                       | 42.3 | 38.9 | 44.7 |
| Peru               | 58.0                                 | 63.4 | 72.6                                       | 63.6 | 68.5 | 77.4 |
| Dominican Republic | 39.4                                 | 46.8 | 62.0                                       | 43.2 | 50.5 | 65.0 |
| <b>Group C c/</b>  |                                      |      |                                            |      |      |      |
| Brazil             | 55.8                                 | 62.8 | 74.8                                       | 57.0 | 63.7 | 75.4 |
| Colombia           | 59.3                                 | 66.3 | 77.4                                       | 64.0 | 70.3 | 80.4 |
| Mexico             | 58.9                                 | 67.3 | 76.3                                       | 60.7 | 67.5 | 77.5 |
| Panama             | 47.8                                 | 55.3 | 67.7                                       | 52.9 | 60.4 | 71.2 |
| Venezuela          | 72.1                                 | 76.2 | 82.6                                       | 75.9 | 79.5 | 84.6 |

Source: CELADE projections prepared on the basis of official information.

a/ Countries of early urbanization, low fertility rate and high life expectancy.

b/ Countries of late urbanization, high fertility rate and low life expectancy.

c/ Countries of high polarization.

Table 4

LATIN AMERICA: RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF THE POPULATION BETWEEN 15 AND 24 YEARS OF AGE IN THE ECONOMICALLY ACTIVE POPULATION, ACCORDING TO URBAN-RURAL AREA (1970-2000)

|                   | 1970  |       | 1980  |       | 2000  |       |
|-------------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
|                   | Urban | Rural | Urban | Rural | Urban | Rural |
| <b>Group A a/</b> |       |       |       |       |       |       |
| Argentina         | 23.5  | 30.8  | 23.2  | 30.0  | 22.0  | 28.4  |
| Costa Rica        | 30.1  | 34.7  | 31.7  | 35.4  | 22.4  | 24.1  |
| Cuba              | 22.7  | 29.3  | 29.3  | 30.6  | 14.5  | 19.5  |
| Chile             | 25.4  | 28.0  | 26.1  | 28.6  | 19.8  | 21.3  |
| Uruguay           | 21.4  | 23.9  | 22.4  | 24.9  | 20.9  | 23.1  |
| <b>Group B b/</b> |       |       |       |       |       |       |
| Bolivia           | 29.7  | 26.5  | 28.6  | 26.3  | 24.9  | 32.1  |
| Ecuador           | 28.3  | 30.0  | 29.4  | 30.5  | 28.0  | 27.9  |
| El Salvador       | 30.8  | 30.7  | 32.7  | 32.5  | 29.5  | 29.6  |
| Guatemala         | 30.7  | 31.9  | 30.7  | 31.7  | 26.8  | 29.0  |
| Haiti             | 29.2  | 25.3  | 30.9  | 26.8  | 30.6  | 26.4  |
| Honduras          | 32.2  | 29.0  | 34.5  | 31.4  | 33.3  | 30.3  |
| Nicaragua         | 30.6  | 33.2  | 31.3  | 33.6  | 29.3  | 31.3  |
| Paraguay          | 34.5  | 34.2  | 31.4  | 36.5  | 28.5  | 30.8  |
| Peru              | 25.6  | 24.2  | 26.7  | 24.5  | 25.2  | 21.6  |
| Dominican Rep.    | 28.9  | 29.2  | 30.3  | 30.8  | 23.3  | 24.4  |
| <b>Group C c/</b> |       |       |       |       |       |       |
| Brazil            | 28.5  | 32.8  | 28.9  | 33.4  | 24.6  | 29.1  |
| Colombia          | 32.6  | 30.7  | 32.5  | 30.9  | 24.8  | 23.7  |
| Mexico            | 30.3  | 32.6  | 31.2  | 33.2  | 27.4  | 29.0  |
| Panamá            | 30.9  | 31.2  | 30.6  | 30.6  | 24.0  | 23.4  |
| Venezuela         | 29.1  | 30.9  | 30.2  | 32.1  | 25.6  | 27.4  |

Source: CELADE projections prepared on the basis of official information.

- a/ Countries of early urbanization, low fertility rate and high life expectancy.  
b/ Countries of late urbanization, high fertility rate and low life expectancy.  
c/ Countries of high polarization.

Table 5

LATIN AMERICA: ACTIVITY RATES OF THE POPULATION BETWEEN 15 AND 24 YEARS OF AGE, ACCORDING TO URBAN-RURAL AREA (1970, 1980 AND 2000)

|                   | 1970  |       | 1980  |       | 2000  |       |
|-------------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
|                   | Urban | Rural | Urban | Rural | Urban | Rural |
| <b>Group A a/</b> |       |       |       |       |       |       |
| Argentina         | 57.3  | 58.0  | 58.0  | 56.4  | 58.5  | 52.8  |
| Costa Rica        | 46.7  | 54.4  | 48.5  | 52.9  | 50.9  | 49.2  |
| Cuba              | 43.4  | 45.1  | 42.1  | 43.5  | 44.7  | 44.0  |
| Chile             | 41.3  | 50.8  | 41.8  | 49.4  | 42.8  | 46.7  |
| Uruguay           | 54.3  | 62.0  | 54.2  | 59.2  | 56.7  | 56.0  |
| <b>Group B b/</b> |       |       |       |       |       |       |
| Bolivia           | 41.3  | 51.0  | 42.2  | 49.3  | 42.5  | 46.9  |
| Ecuador           | 39.9  | 50.8  | 41.1  | 16.5  | 43.0  | 45.6  |
| El Salvador       | 53.3  | 57.1  | 53.9  | 55.9  | 54.8  | 53.5  |
| Guatemala         | 48.0  | 48.8  | 48.9  | 47.8  | 50.3  | 46.0  |
| Haiti             | 56.6  | 75.8  | 56.2  | 74.4  | 55.7  | 71.5  |
| Honduras          | 43.9  | 51.6  | 47.2  | 52.0  | 52.5  | 47.3  |
| Nicaragua         | 41.1  | 48.9  | 42.9  | 48.6  | 45.1  | 47.2  |
| Paraguay          | 55.5  | 55.6  | 57.2  | 55.4  | 58.4  | 54.1  |
| Peru              | 39.0  | 48.6  | 39.9  | 46.9  | 42.5  | 44.9  |
| Dominican Rep.    | 43.3  | 53.3  | 43.7  | 53.1  | 45.0  | 52.8  |
| <b>Group C c/</b> |       |       |       |       |       |       |
| Brazil            | 45.7  | 55.0  | 46.3  | 54.2  | 47.9  | 52.6  |
| Colombia          | 48.1  | 51.7  | 48.7  | 51.3  | 49.8  | 50.2  |
| Mexico            | 41.1  | 48.0  | 42.8  | 47.3  | 45.5  | 45.8  |
| Panama            | 55.7  | 57.8  | 55.8  | 56.1  | 55.6  | 52.3  |
| Venezuela         | 42.1  | 47.6  | 43.3  | 47.1  | 44.8  | 46.1  |

Source: CELADE projections prepared on the basis of official information.

- a/ Countries of early urbanization, low fertility rate and high life expectancy.
- b/ Countries of late urbanization, high fertility rate and low life expectancy.
- c/ Countries of high polarization.



Table 6

LATIN AMERICA: ECONOMICALLY ACTIVE POPULATION BETWEEN 10 AND 24 YEARS  
OF AGE ACCORDING TO URBAN-RURAL AREA (1970, 1980 AND 2000)  
(Thousands of persons)

|                   | 1970     |          | 1980     |          | 2000     |          | Percentage of active<br>urban population |      |      |
|-------------------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|------------------------------------------|------|------|
|                   | Urban    | Rural    | Urban    | Rural    | Urban    | Rural    | 1970                                     | 1980 | 2000 |
| <b>Group A a/</b> |          |          |          |          |          |          |                                          |      |      |
| Argentina         | 1 888.9  | 649.4    | 2 191.7  | 597.5    | 2 749.0  | 506.0    | 74.4                                     | 78.6 | 84.5 |
| Costa Rica        | 70.1     | 123.8    | 124.3    | 155.6    | 194.2    | 125.0    | 36.2                                     | 44.4 | 60.8 |
| Cuba              | 371.3    | 293.7    | 515.4    | 306.1    | 527.7    | 169.1    | 55.8                                     | 62.7 | 75.7 |
| Chile             | 574.9    | 213.4    | 797.5    | 234.7    | 956.6    | 184.5    | 72.9                                     | 77.3 | 83.8 |
| Uruguay           | 201.3    | 58.2     | 221.9    | 53.6     | 260.6    | 45.1     | 77.6                                     | 80.5 | 85.2 |
| <b>Group B b/</b> |          |          |          |          |          |          |                                          |      |      |
| Bolivia           | 170.6    | 271.3    | 251.7    | 295.0    | 494.9    | 431.4    | 38.6                                     | 46.0 | 53.4 |
| Ecuador           | 213.6    | 377.8    | 342.9    | 459.6    | 793.8    | 597.5    | 36.1                                     | 42.7 | 57.1 |
| El Salvador       | 170.5    | 280.8    | 272.1    | 351.1    | 594.4    | 472.1    | 37.8                                     | 43.7 | 55.7 |
| Guatemala         | 199.3    | 409.9    | 298.1    | 530.7    | 582.3    | 784.6    | 32.7                                     | 36.0 | 42.6 |
| Haiti             | 143.6    | 674.3    | 213.6    | 815.9    | 468.2    | 1 107.2  | 17.6                                     | 20.7 | 29.7 |
| Honduras          | 84.4     | 208.5    | 152.6    | 262.9    | 446.3    | 327.6    | 28.8                                     | 36.7 | 57.7 |
| Nicaragua         | 84.1     | 124.4    | 140.4    | 148.5    | 338.3    | 196.0    | 40.3                                     | 48.6 | 63.3 |
| Paraguay          | 113.3    | 165.9    | 157.8    | 250.9    | 301.8    | 361.3    | 40.6                                     | 38.6 | 45.5 |
| Peru              | 658.1    | 482.3    | 1 005.6  | 557.7    | 1 969.8  | 636.2    | 57.7                                     | 64.3 | 75.6 |
| Dominican Rep.    | 192.1    | 360.1    | 327.5    | 448.9    | 588.4    | 419.1    | 34.8                                     | 42.2 | 58.4 |
| <b>Group C c/</b> |          |          |          |          |          |          |                                          |      |      |
| Brazil            | 4 966.7  | 5 714.0  | 7 628.6  | 6 268.0  | 12 995.7 | 5 594.9  | 46.5                                     | 54.9 | 69.9 |
| Colombia          | 1 377.5  | 968.2    | 2 078.8  | 1 062.5  | 3 041.0  | 857.5    | 58.7                                     | 66.2 | 78.0 |
| Mexico            | 2 605.3  | 2 150.2  | 4 293.3  | 2 500.1  | 8 725.1  | 2 667.4  | 54.8                                     | 63.2 | 76.6 |
| Panama            | 86.3     | 88.8     | 133.7    | 98.5     | 213.0    | 85.8     | 49.3                                     | 57.6 | 71.3 |
| Venezuela d/      | 667.4    | 241.4    | 1 126.2  | 318.8    | 2 077.8  | 378.1    | 73.4                                     | 77.9 | 84.6 |
| Latin America     | 14 839.3 | 13 856.4 | 22 273.7 | 15 716.6 | 38 318.9 | 15 946.4 | 51.7                                     | 58.6 | 70.6 |

Source: CELADE projections prepared on the basis of official information.

a/ Countries of early urbanization, low fertility rate and high life expectancy.

b/ Countries of late urbanization, high fertility rate and low life expectancy.

c/ Countries of high polarization.

d/ Excluding active population between 10 and 14 years of age.

Table 7

LATIN AMERICA: AVERAGE ANNUAL GROWTH RATES OF THE TOTAL ECONOMICALLY ACTIVE POPULATION AND THE POPULATION BETWEEN 10 AND 24 YEARS OF AGE (1970-1980)

|                      | Total country                  |            |            |            | Urban areas                    |            |            |            |
|----------------------|--------------------------------|------------|------------|------------|--------------------------------|------------|------------|------------|
|                      | Economically active population |            |            |            | Economically active population |            |            |            |
|                      | Total                          | Youth      | Female     |            | Total                          | Youth      | Female     |            |
|                      |                                | (10-24)    | (10-24)    | (20-24)    |                                | (10-24)    | (10-24)    | (20-24)    |
| <u>Group A a/</u>    |                                |            |            |            |                                |            |            |            |
| Argentina            | 1.3                            | 1.0        | 1.5        | 2.2        | 1.8                            | 1.5        | 1.9        | 2.5        |
| Costa Rica           | 3.9                            | 3.7        | 4.9        | 5.8        | 5.5                            | 5.9        | 6.1        | 6.7        |
| Cuba                 | 2.0                            | 2.1        | 2.9        | 1.8        | 3.1                            | 3.3        | 3.7        | 2.6        |
| Chile                | 2.8                            | 2.7        | 3.2        | 3.4        | 3.1                            | 3.3        | 3.4        | 3.6        |
| Uruguay              | 0.3                            | 0.6        | 1.1        | 1.3        | 0.6                            | 1.0        | 1.3        | 1.5        |
| <u>Group B b/</u>    |                                |            |            |            |                                |            |            |            |
| Bolivia              | 2.4                            | 2.2        | 2.8        | 3.3        | 4.5                            | 4.0        | 4.2        | 5.1        |
| Ecuador              | 3.1                            | 3.1        | 4.2        | 5.1        | 4.6                            | 4.8        | 5.1        | 6.0        |
| El Salvador          | 3.1                            | 3.3        | 4.1        | 4.8        | 4.3                            | 4.8        | 5.1        | 5.7        |
| Guatemala            | 3.4                            | 3.1        | 4.1        | 5.1        | 4.3                            | 4.1        | 4.5        | 5.6        |
| Haiti                | 2.0                            | 2.3        | 2.2        | 2.7        | 3.7                            | 4.1        | 3.8        | 4.1        |
| Honduras             | 3.4                            | 3.6        | 7.3        | 7.5        | 5.5                            | 6.1        | 6.7        | 6.9        |
| Nicaragua            | 3.5                            | 3.3        | 4.3        | 5.7        | 5.1                            | 5.3        | 5.3        | 6.4        |
| Paraguay             | 4.0                            | 3.9        | 4.3        | 5.7        | 4.5                            | 3.4        | 4.0        | 5.6        |
| Peru                 | 3.0                            | 3.2        | 4.0        | 4.2        | 4.0                            | 4.3        | 5.1        | 4.9        |
| Dominican Rep.       | 3.4                            | 3.5        | 3.6        | 4.6        | 5.3                            | 5.5        | 5.3        | 5.9        |
| <u>Group C c/</u>    |                                |            |            |            |                                |            |            |            |
| Brazil               | 3.0                            | 2.7        | 3.5        | 4.3        | 4.3                            | 4.4        | 4.7        | 4.9        |
| Colombia             | 3.3                            | 3.0        | 3.6        | 4.4        | 4.4                            | 4.2        | 4.1        | 4.8        |
| Mexico               | 3.6                            | 3.6        | 4.2        | 5.8        | 4.9                            | 5.1        | 5.5        | 7.2        |
| Panama               | 3.2                            | 2.9        | 3.7        | 4.5        | 4.6                            | 4.5        | 4.6        | 5.2        |
| Venezuela            | 4.4                            | 4.8        | 5.4        | 6.5        | 5.0                            | 5.4        | 5.7        | 6.7        |
| <u>Latin America</u> | <u>2.9</u>                     | <u>2.9</u> | <u>3.5</u> | <u>4.3</u> | <u>4.0</u>                     | <u>4.1</u> | <u>4.4</u> | <u>4.9</u> |

Source: CELADE projections prepared on the basis of official information.

a/ Countries of early urbanization, low fertility rate and high life expectancy.

b/ Countries of late urbanization, high fertility rate and low life expectancy.

c/ Countries of high polarization.

Table 8

CHILE AND PANAMA: DISTRIBUTION OF THE ECONOMICALLY ACTIVE FEMALE POPULATION  
BETWEEN 15 AND 24 YEARS OF AGE ACCORDING TO VARIOUS  
SOCIO-OCCUPATIONAL CATEGORIES (1960, 1970 AND 1980)

|                                              | 1960         | 1970         | 1980         |
|----------------------------------------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|
| <b>Chile</b>                                 |              |              |              |
| Office workers, salespeople, professionals   | 19.0         | 27.2         | 34.0         |
| Agricultural workers                         | 3.0          | 2.1          | 2.3          |
| Drivers and manual workers                   | 17.6         | 16.1         | 7.8          |
| Day workers and personal services            | 6.1          | 7.1          | 6.0          |
| Domestic workers                             | 48.4         | 39.9         | 29.3         |
| Others, unemployed                           | 6.0          | 7.6          | 20.6         |
| <b>Total</b>                                 | <b>100.0</b> | <b>100.0</b> | <b>100.0</b> |
| Active population (in thousands)             | (187.3)      | (199.9)      | (302.7)      |
| <b>Panama</b>                                |              |              |              |
| Office workers, sales peoples, professionals | 31.6         | 30.5         | 40.6         |
| Agricultural workers                         | 7.3          | 5.2          | 3.7          |
| Drivers and manual workers                   | 4.8          | 6.4          | 4.5          |
| Day workers and personal services            | 4.6          | 5.7          | 4.7          |
| Domestic workers                             | 40.0         | 36.3         | 28.1         |
| Others, unemployed                           | 11.7         | 15.9         | 18.4         |
| <b>Total</b>                                 | <b>100.0</b> | <b>100.0</b> | <b>100.0</b> |
| Active population (in thousands)             | (25.0)       | (47.7)       | (47.9)       |

Source: Calculated on the basis of official information from population censuses and national employment surveys.



Table 9

LATIN AMERICA: OPEN UNEMPLOYMENT RATES ACCORDING TO SEX AND AGE  
(Urban areas, 1980)

|                                  | Both sexes |       |       |             | Men   |       |       |             | Women |       |       |             |
|----------------------------------|------------|-------|-------|-------------|-------|-------|-------|-------------|-------|-------|-------|-------------|
|                                  | Total      | 15-19 | 20-24 | 25 and over | Total | 15-19 | 20-24 | 25 and over | Total | 15-19 | 20-24 | 25 and over |
| Argentina (1981)                 |            |       |       |             |       |       |       |             |       |       |       |             |
| Capital and Greater Buenos Aires | 5.0        | 14.6  | 7.6   | 3.7         | 4.9   | 13.0  | 8.6   | 3.7         | 5.1   | 17.1  | 5.9   | 3.7         |
| Colombia (1980)                  |            |       |       |             |       |       |       |             |       |       |       |             |
| 7 largest units                  | 9.1        | 22.9  | 12.0  | 3.4         | 7.6   | 21.2  | 10.5  | 3.0         | 11.5  | 24.8  | 13.9  | 4.4         |
| Costa Rica (1982)                |            |       |       |             |       |       |       |             |       |       |       |             |
| Urban areas                      | 10.4       | 25.5  | 12.9  | 5.2         | 9.9   | 26.2  | 11.6  | 4.9         | 11.5  | 23.9  | 15.3  | 5.8         |
| Chile (1980)                     |            |       |       |             |       |       |       |             |       |       |       |             |
| Urban areas                      | 11.4       | 26.1  | 21.5  | 7.5         | 11.9  | 28.2  | 22.2  | 8.1         | 10.3  | 22.0  | 20.4  | 6.2         |
| Mexico (1979)                    |            |       |       |             |       |       |       |             |       |       |       |             |
| Metropolitan area                |            |       |       |             |       |       |       |             |       |       |       |             |
| Mexico City                      | 6.1        | 17.6  | 9.4   | 2.8         | 5.4   | 16.7  | 9.7   | 2.4         | 7.5   | 18.9  | 9.0   | 3.6         |
| Panama (1979)                    |            |       |       |             |       |       |       |             |       |       |       |             |
| National                         | 8.8        | 24.5  | 18.4  | 4.3         | 6.7   | 20.4  | 15.0  | 3.1         | 13.5  | 33.5  | 24.6  | 7.2         |
| Paraguay (1977)                  |            |       |       |             |       |       |       |             |       |       |       |             |
| Asunción and surrounding areas   | 6.7        | 12.8  | 10.8  | 4.0         | 7.2   | 14.7  | 10.2  | 4.8         | 6.0   | 10.6  | 11.4  | 2.9         |
| Peru (1981)                      |            |       |       |             |       |       |       |             |       |       |       |             |
| Urban areas                      | 6.0        | 13.9  | 11.8  | 4.0         | 5.1   | 13.9  | 10.5  | 3.4         | 8.4   | 13.9  | 14.5  | 5.9         |
| Uruguay (1979)                   |            |       |       |             |       |       |       |             |       |       |       |             |
| Department of Montevideo         | 8.1        | 23.6  | 11.0  | 5.6         | 5.6   | 20.4  | 8.1   | 3.4         | 12.0  | 28.3  | 14.7  | 9.2         |
| Venezuela (1980)                 |            |       |       |             |       |       |       |             |       |       |       |             |
| Caracas metropolitan area        | 6.0        | 16.3  | 9.3   | 3.8         | 6.8   | 19.7  | 11.2  | 4.1         | 4.5   | 9.8   | 6.4   | 3.2         |

Source: National household and employment surveys and Population Census of Peru, 1981.

Table 10  
LATIN AMERICA: PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF UNEMPLOYED  
BY AGE GROUP AND SEX  
(Urban areas, 1980)

|                          | Age   | Both<br>sexes | Men  | Women |
|--------------------------|-------|---------------|------|-------|
| <u>Argentina (1981)</u>  | 15-24 | 41.2          | 38.8 | 46.0  |
| Capital and Greater      | 15-19 | 18.9          | 15.1 | 26.4  |
| Buenos Aires             | 20-24 | 22.3          | 23.7 | 19.6  |
| <u>Colombia (1980)</u>   | 15-29 | 79.6          | 76.8 | 82.5  |
| 7 largest cities         | 15-19 | 32.1          | 31.2 | 33.1  |
|                          | 20-29 | 47.5          | 45.6 | 49.4  |
| <u>Costa Rica (1982)</u> | 15-29 | 69.9          | 68.8 | 71.9  |
| Urban areas              | 15-19 | 26.5          | 28.6 | 22.9  |
|                          | 20-29 | 43.4          | 40.2 | 49.0  |
| <u>Chile (1980)</u>      | 15-24 | 50.7          | 48.2 | 56.8  |
| Urban areas              | 15-19 | 16.5          | 16.6 | 16.3  |
|                          | 20-24 | 34.2          | 31.6 | 40.5  |
| <u>Mexico (1979)</u>     | 12-24 | 69.4          | 68.4 | 70.9  |
| Mexico City              | 12-19 | 41.5          | 39.1 | 44.9  |
| Metropolitan area        | 20-24 | 27.9          | 29.3 | 26.0  |
| <u>Panama (1979)</u>     | 15-24 | 64.7          | 66.1 | 63.2  |
| National                 | 15-19 | 28.2          | 30.3 | 25.8  |
|                          | 20-24 | 36.5          | 35.8 | 37.4  |
| <u>Paraguay (1977)</u>   | 12-24 | 60.8          | 54.9 | 70.7  |
| Asunción and surrounding | 12-19 | 34.3          | 34.1 | 34.6  |
| areas                    | 20-24 | 26.5          | 20.8 | 36.1  |
| <u>Peru (1981)</u>       | 15-24 | 49.8          | 48.8 | 51.5  |
| Urban areas              | 15-19 | 18.0          | 17.6 | 18.8  |
|                          | 20-24 | 31.8          | 31.2 | 32.7  |
| <u>Uruguay (1979)</u>    | 14-24 | 46.8          | 52.5 | 42.7  |
| Dept. of Montevideo      | 14-19 | 28.7          | 34.6 | 24.4  |
|                          | 20-24 | 18.1          | 17.9 | 18.3  |
| <u>Venezuela (1980)</u>  | 15-24 | 54.9          | 56.5 | 50.6  |
| Metropolitan area of     | 15-19 | 26.0          | 28.0 | 20.6  |
| Caracas                  | 20-24 | 28.9          | 28.5 | 30.0  |

Source: National household and employment surveys and Population  
Census of Peru, 1981.

Table 11

LATIN AMERICA: OPEN UNEMPLOYMENT RATES AMONG YOUTH 20-29  
YEARS OF AGE, BY SEX AND AREA, ACCORDING  
TO EDUCATIONAL LEVEL, 1970

(Percentages)

| Educational level | Total country | Capital | Other urban | Rural |
|-------------------|---------------|---------|-------------|-------|
| <b>Both sexes</b> |               |         |             |       |
| No education      | 5.7           | 9.7     | 8.9         | 5.0   |
| 1 to 3 years      | 5.8           | 8.4     | 7.8         | 4.5   |
| 4 to 6 years      | 6.9           | 8.1     | 7.6         | 5.3   |
| 7 to 9 years      | 5.6           | 5.3     | 6.2         | 3.5   |
| 10 to 12 years    | 7.3           | 6.9     | 6.4         | 2.7   |
| 13 and over       | 5.9           | 5.8     | 6.3         | 6.9   |
| <b>Men</b>        |               |         |             |       |
| No education      | 4.9           | 13.5    | 8.9         | 3.7   |
| 1 to 3 years      | 4.9           | 10.0    | 7.7         | 3.3   |
| 4 to 6 years      | 6.3           | 8.4     | 7.2         | 4.2   |
| 7 to 9 years      | 5.9           | 5.8     | 6.6         | 3.2   |
| 10 to 12 years    | 9.2           | 7.9     | 7.8         | 3.9   |
| 13 and over       | 5.1           | 4.8     | 5.7         | 4.7   |
| <b>Women</b>      |               |         |             |       |
| No education      | 8.1           | 6.3     | 8.5         | 8.4   |
| 1 to 3 years      | 8.8           | 6.3     | 8.0         | 10.2  |
| 4 to 6 years      | 8.8           | 7.6     | 8.6         | 10.3  |
| 7 to 9 years      | 4.9           | 4.3     | 5.5         | 4.6   |
| 10 to 12 years    | 4.5           | 5.3     | 4.6         | 4.7   |
| 13 and over       | 7.3           | 7.5     | 7.3         | 9.5   |

Source: ECLA, on the basis of figures taken from OMUECE 1970, Programa Uniforme, table 20.

UNESCO/ECLA/UNDP, La educación y los problemas del empleo, Informes finales No. 3, op. cit., table 29.



Table 12

CHILE, PANAMA: OPEN UNEMPLOYMENT RATES IN THE POPULATION BETWEEN 15 AND 24 YEARS OF AGE,  
ACCORDING TO EDUCATIONAL LEVEL AND SEX (1960, 1970 AND 1980)

|                          | 1960       |            |             | 1970       |            |             | 1980        |             |             |
|--------------------------|------------|------------|-------------|------------|------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
|                          | Total      | Men        | Women       | Total      | Men        | Women       | Total       | Men         | Women       |
| <b>CHILE</b>             |            |            |             |            |            |             |             |             |             |
| <u>Educational level</u> |            |            |             |            |            |             |             |             |             |
| 0 - 3                    | 4.6        | 5.5        | 1.8         | 1.3        | 1.6        | 0.4         | 13.5        | 13.6        | 12.8        |
| 4 - 6                    | 5.9        | 7.0        | 3.0         | 1.6        | 1.9        | 0.8         | 14.2        | 15.5        | 10.3        |
| 7 - 9                    | 8.9        | 8.5        | 10.2        | 2.8        | 2.8        | 2.8         | 19.9        | 21.1        | 16.4        |
| 10 and over              | 10.4       | 10.9       | 9.4         | 6.1        | 7.0        | 4.7         | 25.3        | 24.8        | 26.0        |
| <u>Total</u>             | <u>6.4</u> | <u>7.5</u> | <u>4.4</u>  | <u>2.5</u> | <u>2.6</u> | <u>2.0</u>  | <u>20.6</u> | <u>20.7</u> | <u>20.5</u> |
| <b>PANAMA</b>            |            |            |             |            |            |             |             |             |             |
| <u>Educational level</u> |            |            |             |            |            |             |             |             |             |
| 0 - 3                    | 1.7        | 1.4        | 3.9         | 4.3        | 2.8        | 10.5        | 10.5        | 6.9         | 24.4        |
| 4 - 6                    | 7.4        | 6.8        | 9.0         | 9.8        | 7.0        | 16.3        | 11.1        | 10.6        | 12.9        |
| 7 - 9                    | 12.3       | 10.1       | 15.8        | 15.4       | 15.5       | 23.7        | 16.7        | 14.9        | 21.0        |
| 10 and over              | 10.6       | 9.0        | 12.1        | 9.6        | 8.5        | 10.8        | 19.2        | 18.6        | 19.9        |
| <u>Total</u>             | <u>6.5</u> | <u>5.3</u> | <u>10.1</u> | <u>9.3</u> | <u>6.5</u> | <u>15.3</u> | <u>14.7</u> | <u>12.9</u> | <u>18.4</u> |

Source: Calculated on the basis of official information from population censuses and national employment surveys.

Table 13

CHILE, BRAZIL, PANAMA AND PERU: EDUCATIONAL LEVELS OF THE POPULATION  
BETWEEN 15 AND 24 YEARS OF AGE (1960-1970-1980)

|               | Total<br>(Thousands) | 0     | 1-3  | 4-6  | 7-9    | 10-12  | 13 and over | N.D. |
|---------------|----------------------|-------|------|------|--------|--------|-------------|------|
| <u>Chile</u>  |                      |       |      |      |        |        |             |      |
| 1960          | 1 322.4              | 100.0 | 9.3  | 18.4 | 38.6   | 19.9   | 9.3         | 1.3  |
| 1970          | 1 662.2              | 100.0 | 3.4  | 10.6 | 31.1   | 26.2   | 15.9        | 3.5  |
| 1980          | 2 440.7              | 100.0 | 1.7  | 2.5  | 13.8   | 32.5   | 41.3        | 6.4  |
| <u>Brazil</u> |                      |       |      |      |        |        |             |      |
| 1960          | 13 644.2             | 100.0 | 35.8 | 31.8 | 21.3   | 4.8    | 3.9         | 1.8  |
| 1970          | 18 652.0             | 100.0 | 30.6 | 17.9 | 28.1   | 5.4    | 3.9         | 1.2  |
| 1980          | 24 904.1             | 100.0 | 17.0 | 18.3 | 47.7a/ | 13.9b/ | 3.0c/       | 12.8 |
| <u>Panama</u> |                      |       |      |      |        |        |             |      |
| 1960          | 197.2                | 100.0 | 18.3 | 16.2 | 40.2   | 15.3   | 8.4         | 1.3  |
| 1970          | 269.6                | 100.0 | 10.4 | 12.2 | 43.7   | 19.1   | 12.2        | 2.3  |
| 1980          | 361.8                | 100.0 | 4.8  | 5.2  | 31.8   | 26.1   | 24.5        | 6.9  |
| <u>Peru</u>   |                      |       |      |      |        |        |             |      |
| 1961          | 1 822.0              | 100.0 | 29.9 | 28.4 | 23.1   | 10.3   | 5.9         | 1.0  |
| 1972          | 2 563.9              | 100.0 | 12.9 | 21.2 | 25.9   | 20.1   | 13.8        | 3.4  |
| 1981          | 3 443.5              | 100.0 | 6.3  | 35.9 | 45.3   | 9.2    | 2.4         | 3.3  |

Source: Population censuses, except for Chile, 1980, National Employment Survey (October to December 1980).

a/ 1 to 4 years.

b/ 9 to 11 years.

c/ 10 and over.

Table 14

LATIN AMERICA: ILLITERACY RATES OF THE POPULATION BETWEEN 15 AND 24 YEARS OF AGE, ACCORDING TO URBAN-RURAL AREA, 1960-1970

|                   | Total country |      |      | Rural |      | Urban a/ |      | Capital |      | 1980  |             |
|-------------------|---------------|------|------|-------|------|----------|------|---------|------|-------|-------------|
|                   | 1960          | 1970 |      | 1960  | 1970 | 1960     | 1970 | 1960    | 1970 | Total | Rural Urban |
| <b>Group A b/</b> |               |      |      |       |      |          |      |         |      |       |             |
| Argentina         | 5.1           | 4.2  | -    | -     | -    | -        | -    | -       | 1.0  |       |             |
| Costa Rica        | 10.1          | 5.2  | 14.0 | 7.8   | -    | 3.6      | 1.9  | 3.2     | 1.7  |       |             |
| Chile             | 9.7           | 4.7  | 21.3 | 11.5  | -    | 4.2      | 2.8  | 3.4     | 2.1  |       |             |
| Uruguay           | 2.7           | -    | -    | -     | -    | -        | -    | -       | -    |       |             |
| <b>Group B c/</b> |               |      |      |       |      |          |      |         |      |       |             |
| Bolivia           | -             | 17.3 | -    | -     | -    | -        | -    | -       | -    |       |             |
| Ecuador           | 23.0          | 14.2 | 32.6 | 24.9  | -    | 6.6      | 6.7  | 4.4     | 3.8  |       |             |
| El Salvador       | 45.6          | 28.8 | 61.7 | 43.4  | -    | 20.9     | 10.3 | 10.2    | 4.8  |       |             |
| Guatemala         | 57.2          | 45.4 | 73.0 | 60.4  | -    | 28.0     | 20.5 | 12.9    | 9.8  |       |             |
| Honduras          | 48.7          | 27.1 | 56.2 | -     | -    | 14.9     | -    | 15.1    | 3.4  |       |             |
| Nicaragua         | -             | 35.1 | -    | -     | -    | -        | -    | -       | -    |       |             |
| Paraguay          | 14.6          | 9.6  | 19.6 | 13.0  | -    | 8.6      | 4.7  | 4.7     | 3.2  |       |             |
| Peru              | -             | 13.5 | -    | -     | -    | -        | -    | -       | -    | 6.6   | 17.3 2.0    |
| <b>Group C d/</b> |               |      |      |       |      |          |      |         |      |       |             |
| Brazil            | 32.8          | 24.5 | -    | 42.4  | -    | -        | 11.1 | -       | -    | 15.7  | 33.6 7.9    |
| Colombia          | 18.5          | 11.5 | 30.7 | 23.0  | -    | 8.7      | 6.8  | 5.5     | 4.8  |       |             |
| Mexico            | 26.2          | 16.4 | 38.5 | -     | -    | 14.1     | -    | 8.7     | 5.2  |       |             |
| Panama            | 18.3          | 12.4 | 30.9 | 23.8  | -    | 2.4      | 2.5  | 1.4     | 1.9  |       |             |
| Venezuela         | -             | 12.0 | -    | -     | -    | -        | -    | -       | -    |       |             |

Source: ECLA, "El Desarrollo de América Latina y sus repercusiones en la Educación", Cuadernos de la CEPAL Series No. 41, Santiago, Chile, 1982, table 12, p. 85.

- a/ Including the capital.  
b/ Countries of early urbanization, low fertility rate and high life expectancy.  
c/ Countries of late urbanization, high fertility rate and low life expectancy.  
d/ Countries of high polarization.



Table 15

LATIN AMERICA: PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF ILLITERATE YOUTH BETWEEN  
15 AND 24 YEARS OF AGE BY URBAN-RURAL AREA, 1970

|                   | Total illiterate youth<br>15-24 years | Total | Percentage of illiterate<br>youth 15-24<br>years |       |
|-------------------|---------------------------------------|-------|--------------------------------------------------|-------|
|                   |                                       |       | Urban                                            | Rural |
| <u>Group A a/</u> |                                       |       |                                                  |       |
| Costa Rica        | 17 533                                | 100.0 | 17.0                                             | 83.0  |
| Chile             | 82 456                                | 100.0 | 47.6                                             | 52.4  |
| <u>Group B b/</u> |                                       |       |                                                  |       |
| Bolivia           | 134 519                               | 100.0 | 14.6                                             | 85.4  |
| Ecuador           | 159 041                               | 100.0 | 27.5                                             | 72.5  |
| El Salvador       | 190 263                               | 100.0 | 15.9                                             | 84.1  |
| Guatemala         | 471 038                               | 100.0 | 16.9                                             | 83.1  |
| Nicaragua         | 136 123                               | 100.0 | 16.4                                             | 83.6  |
| Paraguay          | 43 000                                | 100.0 | 20.5                                             | 79.5  |
| Peru              | 342 664                               | 100.0 | 22.2                                             | 77.8  |
| <u>Group C c/</u> |                                       |       |                                                  |       |
| Brazil            | 4 517 058                             | 100.0 | 25.7                                             | 74.3  |
| Colombia          | 482 702                               | 100.0 | 42.0                                             | 58.0  |
| Panama            | 34 631                                | 100.0 | 10.8                                             | 89.2  |
| Venezuela         | 241 630                               | 100.0 | 47.1                                             | 52.9  |

Source: ECLA, "El desarrollo de América Latina y sus repercusiones en la  
educación", Cuadernos de la CEPAL series No. 41, op. cit., tables 6  
and 7, pp. 77-78.

- a/ Countries of early urbanization, low fertility rate and high life expectancy.  
b/ of late urbanization, high fertility rate and low life expectancy.  
c/ Countries of high polarization.

Table 16

LATIN AMERICA: PERCENTAGES OF POPULATION BETWEEN 15 AND 24 YEARS AND 25 YEARS AND OVER WITH 3 OR LESS YEARS OF EDUCATION ACCORDING TO URBAN-RURAL AREA, 1970

|                   | Total    |             | Urban    |             | Rural    |             |
|-------------------|----------|-------------|----------|-------------|----------|-------------|
|                   | 15 to 24 | 25 and over | 15 to 24 | 25 and over | 15 to 24 | 25 and over |
| <u>Group A a/</u> |          |             |          |             |          |             |
| Argentina         | -        | -           | -        | -           | -        | -           |
| Costa Rica        | 18.4     | 47.3        | 9.1      | 28.4        | 26.1     | 63.4        |
| Cuba              | -        | -           | -        | -           | -        | -           |
| Chile             | 14.9     | 33.1        | 10.0     | 20.8        | 33.0     | 63.2        |
| Uruguay           | -        | -           | -        | -           | -        | -           |
| <u>Group B b/</u> |          |             |          |             |          |             |
| Bolivia           | 37.7     | 67.7        | 17.9     | 43.0        | 55.3     | 83.8        |
| Ecuador           | 31.2     | 55.5        | 17.5     | 36.8        | 50.8     | 77.0        |
| El Salvador       | 54.8     | 77.4        | 28.1     | 57.4        | 75.8     | 92.3        |
| Guatemala         | 69.3     | 81.2        | 40.4     | 59.3        | 86.6     | 93.6        |
| Haiti             | 79.8     | 89.6        | 50.8     | 62.9        | 89.6     | 95.8        |
| Honduras          | 52.5     | 75.9        | -        | -           | -        | -           |
| Nicaragua         | 57.7     | 73.3        | 32.1     | 53.9        | 83.5     | 91.9        |
| Paraguay          | 32.6     | 60.2        | 16.8     | 39.9        | 43.6     | 73.5        |
| Peru              | 35.1     | 60.0        | 19.3     | 41.5        | 65.6     | 87.5        |
| Dominican Rep.    | 44.5     | 67.2        | 27.4     | 41.0        | 58.4     | 82.4        |
| <u>Group C c/</u> |          |             |          |             |          |             |
| Brazil            | -        | -           | -        | -           | -        | -           |
| Colombia          | 40.6     | 58.5        | 28.0     | 48.4        | 71.5     | 85.1        |
| Mexico            | 44.9     | 67.2        | -        | -           | -        | -           |
| Panama            | 22.6     | 43.4        | 7.2      | 33.7        | 40.3     | 67.7        |
| Venezuela         | 30.4     | 54.4        | 22.6     | 45.5        | 69.2     | 89.9        |

Source: ECLA, "El desarrollo de América Latina y sus repercusiones en la educación", Cuadernos de la CEPAL series No. 41, op. cit., tables 6 and 7, pp. 77-78.

a/ Countries of early urbanization, low fertility rate and high life expectancy.

b/ Countries of late urbanization, high fertility rate and low life expectancy.

c/ Countries of high polarization.

Table 17

CHILE-PANAMA: EDUCATIONAL LEVELS OF THE ACTIVE POPULATION BETWEEN 15 AND 24 YEARS OF AGE  
ACCORDING TO VARIOUS SOCIO-OCCUPATIONAL CATEGORIES, 1960, 1970 AND 1980

| Occupational groups                                          | Year | Chile          |       |                          |      |                       | Panama         |       |                          |      |                       |
|--------------------------------------------------------------|------|----------------|-------|--------------------------|------|-----------------------|----------------|-------|--------------------------|------|-----------------------|
|                                                              |      | Total          |       | Number of years of study |      |                       | Total          |       | Number of years of study |      |                       |
|                                                              |      | Thou-<br>sands | %     | 0-3                      | 4-6  | 7-9<br>10 and<br>over | Thou-<br>sands | %     | 0-3                      | 4-6  | 7-9<br>10 and<br>over |
| Total active population                                      | 1960 | 675.9          | 100.0 | 31.7                     | 41.7 | 14.8                  | 95.9           | 100.0 | 31.6                     | 45.9 | 10.7                  |
|                                                              | 1970 | 691.6          | 100.0 | 16.9                     | 37.8 | 18.3                  | 12.5           | 100.0 | 22.7                     | 48.7 | 13.5                  |
|                                                              | 1980 | 940.6          | 100.0 | 5.6                      | 19.0 | 31.8                  | 2.2            | 100.0 | 10.0                     | 40.1 | 18.1                  |
| Office workers, sales-<br>people, professional,<br>technical | 1960 | 96.7           | 100.0 | 7.4                      | 24.9 | 25.9                  | 7.5            | 100.0 | 3.1                      | 27.3 | 21.3                  |
|                                                              | 1970 | 131.9          | 100.0 | 4.8                      | 15.4 | 21.4                  | 14.2           | 100.0 | 2.2                      | 22.9 | 19.2                  |
|                                                              | 1980 | 217.6          | 100.0 | 2.8                      | 7.3  | 17.7                  | -              | 100.0 | 0.7                      | 11.6 | 13.4                  |
| Agricultural workers                                         | 1960 | 190.2          | 100.0 | 55.4                     | 37.6 | 2.6                   | 3.5            | 100.0 | 55.0                     | 42.9 | 1.8                   |
|                                                              | 1970 | 154.8          | 100.0 | 33.7                     | 48.6 | 6.5                   | 9.5            | 100.0 | 47.4                     | 50.1 | 2.0                   |
|                                                              | 1980 | 152.8          | 100.0 | 12.4                     | 38.7 | 36.2                  | 1.8            | 100.0 | 24.5                     | 62.5 | 9.3                   |
| Drivers, manual<br>workers                                   | 1960 | 150.6          | 100.0 | 15.4                     | 53.5 | 23.1                  | 1.7            | 100.0 | 10.2                     | 55.2 | 22.3                  |
|                                                              | 1970 | 157.7          | 100.0 | 10.4                     | 41.2 | 25.5                  | 12.1           | 100.0 | 8.9                      | 53.3 | 25.5                  |
|                                                              | 1980 | 159.8          | 100.0 | 4.3                      | 14.9 | 38.5                  | 2.4            | 100.0 | 4.8                      | 40.1 | 30.5                  |
| Day workers,<br>personal services                            | 1960 | 151.9          | 100.0 | 40.5                     | 47.6 | 8.5                   | 2.4            | 100.0 | 18.6                     | 63.3 | 13.8                  |
|                                                              | 1970 | 156.1          | 100.0 | 19.5                     | 46.7 | 16.5                  | 13.4           | 100.0 | 14.8                     | 65.3 | 15.3                  |
|                                                              | 1980 | 204.6          | 100.0 | 6.7                      | 27.4 | 40.4                  | 2.5            | 100.0 | 6.5                      | 50.8 | 26.6                  |
| Others                                                       | 1960 | 42.7           | 100.0 | 17.3                     | 40.8 | 31.1                  | 4.3            | 100.0 | 8.4                      | 56.4 | 20.2                  |
|                                                              | 1970 | 73.8           | 100.0 | 13.4                     | 31.9 | 25.7                  | 15.0           | 100.0 | 8.2                      | 31.3 | 15.0                  |
|                                                              | 1980 | 14.8           | 100.0 | -                        | 10.8 | 1.6                   | 60.8           | -     | -                        | -    | -                     |
| Unemployed                                                   | 1960 | 43.2           | 100.0 | 22.7                     | 38.2 | 20.7                  | 4.9            | 100.0 | 8.4                      | 52.1 | 20.3                  |
|                                                              | 1970 | 17.2           | 100.0 | 8.8                      | 23.8 | 20.9                  | 10.8           | 100.0 | 10.4                     | 51.5 | 22.4                  |
|                                                              | 1980 | 191.2          | 100.0 | 3.7                      | 13.6 | 30.6                  | 1.2            | 100.0 | 7.2                      | 30.4 | 20.6                  |

Source: Special tabulations from Population Censuses, except for Chile 1980, National Employment Survey (October-December 1980).  
a/ Including others.